

THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR WORKPLACE AMENITIES

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[Link to Paper](#)

Motivation

- Jobs offer more than wages—they also provide safety, flexibility, dignity, etc.
- These “non-wage amenities” matter to workers but are hard to measure.
- This paper introduces a **new method to estimate the value of amenities**, using a bunching-based approach.
- Application: During COVID-19, workers had to weigh health risks against income.

Intuition Behind the Bunching Approach


Bunching

- Eligibility thresholds (e.g. for benefits) create incentives to stay just below.
- Some workers reduce earnings or hours to qualify — this creates “bunching.”

Amenities

- Innovation of this paper:** The extent of bunching reflects the value of workplace amenities.
- When amenities are valuable (e.g. safer jobs), fewer workers reduce hours — less bunching.
- Comparing bunching before and after amenity changes reveals willingness to pay.
 - Example: increase in COVID-19 risk → more bunching → reveals value placed on safety.

Estimating Amenity Value from Bunching



Core idea: Compare bunching before and after an amenity change.

WTP Formula:

$$WTP_r = \frac{(\hat{m}' - \hat{m})}{(\hat{m}' - \hat{m}) + (\hat{m} - m^*)} \quad (1)$$

- WTP is the share of income workers are willing to pay for an amenity.

Data and Estimation Approach

Data:

- Earnings:** Timesheet data from Homebase, hourly workers at small U.S. businesses.
- Time:** Oct 2019–July 2020 (FPUC program window).
- Risk:** Based on task exposure and local COVID-19 fatalities.


Estimation Strategy:

- Use DiD to estimate **bunching** at 21 state-specific unemployment insurance eligibility thresholds.

$$E_{wmtk} = \pi^{mt} + \sum_{k=-650}^{1300} \beta^k \cdot I_k + \sum_{k=-650}^{1300} \eta^k \cdot I_k \cdot C_t + \varepsilon_{wmtk} \quad (2)$$

- E_{wmtk} : count of worker-week (w, t) observations in earnings bin m and k Dollars from threshold.
- C_t : post-policy indicator.
- η^k : excess/missing mass due to policy.

Figure 3: Excess and Missing Mass at Threshold




Panel A: Eligible workers

Panel B: Ineligible workers
(placebo)

Notes: Coefficients η_k estimate mass shifts at the threshold. Panel A: workers eligible for MWB. Panel B: placebo group with no eligibility cutoff. 95% confidence intervals shown. Source: Homebase.

Figure 5: Bunching by Industry Risk Level



Notes: Excess mass (bunching) at the earnings threshold across industries sorted by COVID-19 risk levels. Bunching is more pronounced in higher-risk sectors. Source: Homebase data.

Robustness Checks: What Could Drive Differences in Bunching Besides Risk?

- Changes in labor demand?** No effect in (ineligible) placebo group, robust to controls for industry-week FE, local business revenues, business closures, local employment
- Worker selection?** Robust to controls for worker FE and labor supply elasticity
- School closures or child care constraints?** Robust to controls for in-person instruction and week-by-state fixed effects.

Key Results

- Workers bunch below the threshold to claim benefits.
- Bunching increases with workplace COVID-19 risk.
- Workers are willing to forgo 9% of income to avoid a 1-in-100,000 fatality risk.
- Implied Value of Statistical Life (VSL):
 - \$5.6 million (standard)
 - \$8 million (adjusted for risk misperceptions)