Women and Radical Religious Rule:

Evidence from Afghanistan

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Abstract

We analyze how growing up under the *Taliban* rule (1996-2001) affects educational attainment and labor market outcomes of Afghan women. While in power, the *Taliban* ruled a large fraction of the Afghan territory. Using data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, we rely on the fact that, depending on their year of birth and district of residence, individuals were or were not exposed to the *Taliban* government during school age. Our Difference-in-Differences estimates show that women who were exposed to the *Taliban* government during school age are about 6 percentage points less likely to complete basic education than women who were not. Our regressions also suggest that these findings are not due to alternative mechanisms, such as the introduction in 1992 of the provisional Islamist government that came before the *Taliban*, cultural differences related to ethnicity or differences across districts in the number of violent events of the post-2001 insurgency. With regard to labor market outcomes, our analysis shows that women who were exposed to the radical religious rule during school age are less likely to be employed outside the household and more likely to have an agricultural job within the household, which is often an unpaid job. The labor market (education) consequences are larger (smaller) in absolute value in the capital, Kabul. We discuss our empirical findings in relation to the theoretical economic literature on radical religious groups.

JEL classification: Z12; J16; I2; J01.

Keywords: *Taliban*; women; schooling; labor market outcomes.

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1. Introduction

A recent economic literature has shed light on the functioning of radical religious groups[2]. According to this literature, in contexts where institutions work poorly, radical religious groups may become major suppliers of both political action and social services such as public safety, schools, justice, and health. Important examples of such groups are the *Taliban* in Afghanistan, *Hamas* in the Gaza Strip and *Hezbollah* in Lebanon.

A relevant prediction of an insightful theoretical tool used by this literature - a club framework that presents voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of public goods - is that the threat of defection of group members can rationally explain episodes of destructive behavior and gratuitous cruelty, such as the general strikes imposed by *Hamas* on Palestinians and the subjugation of women and minorities by the *Taliban* in Afghanistan (see Berman and Laitin, 2008 and Berman, 2009).

Despite the rapid growth of recent literature, we know very little about how life is under radical religious rules. Empirical investigations of the economic consequences of radical religious groups are rare. This is unfortunate as radical groups such *Taliban* in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as Al-Shabab in Somalia control important parts of the territories. With regard to the former group, the current Obama administration and the Afghan government consider talks with the *Taliban* and potentially sharing power with them as a viable strategy leading to a more peaceful end to war in Afghanistan (see the New York Times, 2012). Therefore, in addition to the analysis of the functioning of radical groups, it is important to empirically examine the economic consequences of their rules on the targeted groups.

In this paper, we consider one of the most striking examples of destructive behavior associated to a radical religious group: the subjugation of women by the *Taliban* during their government in Afghanistan. The *Taliban*, a political and religious group mainly made of rural Pashtuns educated in Pakistani madrassas, ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. During

[2] See Iannaccone (1992), Berman (2000), Berman (2003), Berman and Stepanyan (2004), Caplan (2006), Iannaccone and Berman (2006), Jaeger and Paserman (2006), Benmelech and Berrebi (2007), Berman and Laitin (2008), Berman (2009), Gould and Klor (2010), Jaeger, Klor, Miaari and Paserman (2012), Makowsky (2012), and McBride and Richardson (2012) among others. Following Berman and Laitin (2008), radical religious groups can be defined as groups that distance themselves from the mainstream culture by creating some sort of tension.

their government, they banned girls from going to school and women from working outside the home (see Rashid, 2000). This is however a controversial question: according to a former high-ranking *Taliban* official who served as Afghanistan's ambassador to Pakistan in 2001, the movement was not against educating women and the ban on girls' schools was only a "temporary measure" (see the Guardian, 2011a). After their removal from power in 2001 they regrouped as an insurgency movement and targeted several girls' schools, their students and teachers in violent attacks (see, for instance, the Guardian, 2011b and Larson, 2009).

We first quantify the consequences of the *Taliban* rule on Afghan women's schooling outcomes. Our Difference-in-Differences methodology relies on the fact that the *Taliban* did not control all the districts in Afghanistan. They ruled about 90% of the Afghan territory. Depending on the year of birth and district of residence, individuals were or were not exposed to the *Taliban* government during school age. We estimate how exposure to the treatment affected the number of years of education, the probability of completing basic schooling, literacy ability and attendance of formal schools. Our estimates show that women who were exposed to the *Taliban* government during school age are about 6 percentage points less likely to complete basic education than women who were not. Estimates are qualitatively similar when we use literacy ability and attendance of formal schools as dependent variables. Moreover, we find that for women an additional year of exposure to the *Taliban* government during school age implies a reduction of about 0.15 years of education.

Results are also robust when we consider an estimation sample that includes women residing in non-Pashtun districts only. The Pashtun is the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, and the *Taliban* members mostly belong to this ethnic group. Restricting our attention to non-Pashtun districts allows us to discard the possibility of our results being simply driven by cultural differences across districts. Also, in these regressions we compare districts that are very similar in several dimensions, except the fact of being occupied by the

Taliban. This makes the "parallel trends" assumption, which is required for the Difference-in-Differences estimation, more likely to hold.

To provide additional support to the assumption of common trends for the treatment and control groups in the absence of the *Taliban* regime, we also run placebo regressions. We rely on an empirical strategy similar to the one used in our main regressions, but we exclude from the estimation sample the individuals who were exposed to the *Taliban* during school age. We compare women who were exposed to the provisional Islamist government of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-1996) while they were aged 6-15, with women who were instead in school age during the Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah (1987-1992). This placebo test shows a non-statistically significant difference and, therefore, provides additional support to the validity of our Difference-in-Differences methodology. These estimates are also useful to dismiss that the results are due to the introduction of an Islamist government that came before the *Taliban*.

Our empirical strategy also shows that differences in violent events of the post-2001 insurgency between districts that were occupied by the *Taliban* in the period 1996-2001, and districts that were not, explains very little of the negative relationship between exposure to the treatment and women's education. Our analysis informs us that it was the ban on girls' education, and not the other mechanisms described above, the main channel behind the estimated effects of the *Taliban* rule on women's education.

We further explore the consequences of the radical religious rule in Afghanistan on women's labor market outcomes. For this purpose, we present two sets of regressions that rely on very different assumptions. First, we look at the role of education for women's labor market outcomes at the time of the survey, using exposure to the *Taliban* during school age as an instrumental variable for education. These specifications assume that exposure to the radical religious rule at youth in Afghanistan affected women's outcomes in the labor market through its impact on education only. Second, we estimate the reduced form effect of exposure to the *Taliban*. This specification allows the radical religious rule influencing the

labor market outcomes of interest through several channels, and not only through the education channel. For this reason, the estimates of the reduced form effect are the ones we consider more reliable. Our analysis suggests that women who were exposed to the *Taliban* rule while they were of school age have a 1.4 percentage point lower probability of being employed outside the household than women who where not exposed, and a 6.7 percentage points higher likelihood to have agricultural jobs within the household, often as unpaid family workers.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the *Taliban* and the status of women in Afghanistan. Section 3 provides a brief description of the data. Section 4 presents our analysis of the consequences of the *Taliban* religious rule on women's educational outcomes. Section 5 concerns the effects on women's labor market outcomes. Section 6 analyzes whether the consequences of the radical religious rule were different in the Afghan capital, Kabul. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Background information on the *Taliban* and the status of women in Afghanistan

2.1. The *Taliban*

The *Taliban* is a religious and political group that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001[3]. Its members mostly belong to the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Pashtun. Several authors have stressed how ethnic divisions had important influences on the politics of the *Taliban* in Afghanistan (Johnson and Mason, 2007). Many of its members studied in *madrassas* (religious boarding schools) in Pakistan, which were influenced by the Deobandi philosophy founded at the Dar ul-Ulum *madrassa* in Deoband (India) in 1866[4].

The *Taliban* movement has often been categorized as a radical Islamist group, and several Muslim scholars criticized their interpretation of the Sharia law (see PHR's (2008) report; The Cairo Declaration; Final Report of the International Conference on Population

[3] For more details on the *Taliban* movement, we refer the interested reader to Rashid (2000).

[4] See Andrabi, Das, Khwaja and Zajonc (2006) and Andrabi, Das, Khwaja and Zajonc (2008) for analyses of religious school enrollment in Pakistan.

and Reproductive Health in the Muslim World (21-24 February 1998, Al-Azhar University, Cairo); Health Promotion through Islamic Lifestyles: The Amman Declaration, WHO, 1996)[5].

The movement started in a period in which a provisional Islamist government (the *Mujahideen*, warriors of God) under Burhanuddin Rabbani was put in place in Afghanistan after the downfall in 1992 of Mohammad Najibullah. The latter was the fourth president of the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The *Taliban* movement was started by Mullah Omar, an ethnic Pashtun from the Hotak tribe of the Ghilzai (Rashid, 2000). As Matinuddin (1999) and Rashid (2000) document, the first time Mullah Omar mobilized his followers armed *madrassa* students was in the spring of 1994 to free teenage girls who had been abducted and raped by a warlord in Singesar. In that occasion, they hanged the *Mujahideen* commander from the barrel of a tank. In few years after this event, the *Taliban* group increased its size, and in September 1996 they seized Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Their government lasted until 2001. After the September 11 attacks, the armed forces of the US, UK, Australia, and the Afghan United Front (Northern Alliance) launched Operation Enduring Freedom, which had the goal of ending the Al-Qaeda's use of Afghanistan as a base, and the removal of the *Taliban* from power. After they were ousted in 2001, the *Taliban* regrouped as an insurgency movement to fight the NATO coalition forces (ISAF, International Security Assistance Force) and the newly established Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

2.2. The status of women in Afghanistan before and after the *Taliban* came to power in 1996

In their 1998 report on health and human rights in Afghanistan, the Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) describe the status of women in the Afghan society over time, and

[5] See Platteau (2011) for an analysis of the relationship between Islam and politics. He stresses that politics tends to dominate religion, and that because of the lack of a centralized religious authority structure and the greater variability of interpretations of the Islamic law, there is a risk that both the ruler and his political opponents try to outbid each other by using the religious idiom.

provide some key dates of their empowerment. In 1964, Afghan women were recognized the right to vote. The 1977 Constitution clearly stated in its article 27 that “women and men, without discrimination have equal rights and obligations before the law". The PHR's 1998 report also document that, by the late 1970s, female students outnumbered male students in Kabul.

The establishment of the Islamist State of Afghanistan in 1992 implied some slowdown in female emancipation. Women had to be modest in their style of dress, and had to cover everything except the face and hands in public. During the Islamist government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, they could continue to work and to study in schools and universities.

The rise to power of the *Taliban* movement had as a major consequence a drastic worsening of the status of women in Afghanistan. Soon after they conquered the capital Kabul in September 1996, the *Taliban* issued several edicts that restricted female rights and freedom. For instance, women were largely prohibited from working, which had very negative consequences especially for the families who lost a male household member because of the war. Also, they could only leave their homes if accompanied by a *mahram*, *i.e.* a close male relative (father, brother, husband and son). When out of their homes with a *mahram*, they had to wear a *burqa*, which covered the face as well, and were not allowed to wear socks or shoes whose color was white, as the *Taliban* flag. Women also had restrictions in wearing shoes that made noise while they were walking, such as shoes with high heels.

During the *Taliban* period, there was a policy of segregating women and men into separate hospitals. As the PHR (1998) documents, in September 1997 the Ministry of Public Health ordered all hospitals in Kabul to suspend medical services to women at all but one hospital, which was poorly equipped and for female patients only.

The *Taliban* also introduced a ban on female presence on television and radio, and a ban on women riding bicycles or motorcycles. The religious police enforced these policies, and punishments were often carried out publicly, as Griffin (2001) documents.

When the *Taliban* ruled Afghanistan, they showed a particular persistence in restricting women's rights related to schooling and investment in human capital. The movement led by Mullah Omar ordered the closing of many private schools that had been educating girls. Many of these schools that had to close were small home-based vocational training programs, which taught girls and young women to weave carpets and sew. Schools were not allowed to teach girls older than 8. Moreover, the content of the education for girls younger than 8 was limited to lessons about the Koran, the Muslim holy book (see the New York Times, 1998)[6].

After they were ousted in 2001, the *Taliban* burnt school buildings and targeted civilians in violent attacks, including teachers who were killed. In 2008, when they ordered the closure of all girls' schools in the Swat district in Pakistan, threatening to blow the schools up, the group's leader Shah Dauran provided as justification that "female education is against Islamic teachings and spread vulgarity in society" (see Hussain, 2008). Other examples of activities aimed to discourage the girls' school enrollment were numerous. For instance, the Guardian (2011) and Larson (2009) report the stories of a head of Afghan girls' school killed by the *Taliban*, girls who had acid thrown in their faces while walking to school, schools set on fire or episodes of gas poisonings at girls' schools, in which dozens of girls fell ill.

3. Data and descriptives

We use data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/2008. This is the third round of the NRVA survey, and provides information on a nationally representative sample for Afghanistan. The fieldwork started in mid-August 2007 and finished at the end of August 2008. Compared to the previous two rounds of the survey (2003 and 2005), the NRVA 2007/2008 shows important improvements in the questionnaire, sample design and coverage. The 12-month period allows accounting for seasonality, while

[6] While they were in power, the *Taliban* did not publicly oppose female education, but their official position was that they did not have the resources to establish separate female educational institutions with all female staff. See BBC News UK, 14 January 2011, "Afghan *Taliban* "end" opposition to educating girls".

the first two rounds in 2003 and 2005 presented seasonally biased information. In the Afghan context, the length of the fieldwork is particularly relevant because of the presence of the war. In this case, if at a certain point in time it was dangerous to interview a primary sampling unit, the 2007/2008 round allowed considering the primary sampling unit at a later date rather than replacing it[7].

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on schooling indicators and labor market outcomes. In particular, with regard to the human capital variables, the table includes information on years of education, share of people who completed 9 grades education, literacy rates (share of individuals who can read and write) and share of people who had at least some formal education (versus people who never attended a formal school). Table 1 also includes information on the shares of individuals who participate to the labor force, have a wage work, are unpaid family workers, have an employment outside the household, hold an agricultural employment within the household or have a non-agricultural employment within the household. While the focus of this paper and the regression analysis below is the analysis of the consequences for women, in this section for a descriptive purpose we compare outcomes of women with those of men. The descriptive information in Table 1 concerning women refers to the estimation samples of Tables 2 and 6. It is compared to information related to men of similar age.

All the schooling indicators show the high level of education gender inequalities in Afghanistan. Only 7% of the women in the estimation sample completed basic (nine grades) education, while about 23% of the men of comparable age did. Among the men, about 47% can read and write, and there is a similar percentage that has attended at least some formal school. The literacy rate for women in the estimation sample is about 15%. A large percentage of women never had formal schooling, approximately 84%. The average years of education is about 4 for men, and 1.29 for women.

[7] The difficulty in collecting good quality data in the presence of a long conflict implies that the literature in economics and political science that uses data from Afghanistan is relatively recent. Among the most relevant works, see Condra, Felter, Iyengar and Shapiro (2010), Beath, Christia and Enikopolov (2011), Berman, Callen, Felter, and Shapiro (2011), Gilligan and Noury (2011), Jaeger and Siddique (2011), Lyall, Imai and Blair (2013), Burde and Linden (2013), Blair, Imai and Lyall (forthcoming), and Lind, Moene and Willumsen (forthcoming).

With regard to the labor market variables, 45% of the women in the estimation sample of Table 6 participate to the labor force. This is much lower than the share of men of comparable age, 79%. The percentage of women who hold a wage work is 2 percent, and those who have an employment outside the household represent 1 percent of the estimation sample. Many women are unpaid family workers (32%) and have an agricultural employment within the household (36%). Table 1 also informs us that 24% of men of similar age are employed in jobs for which they receive a wage, while 17% of them are employed outside the household.

In the next sections, we aim to quantify how exposure to the *Taliban* government influenced the very high level of women's segregation that Table 1 shows.

4. Effects of the *Taliban* government on women's education

We start our analysis of the consequences of the *Taliban* government on Afghan women's economic outcomes by analyzing its effects on education. It is important to focus first on human capital investment because education is a good proxy of permanent income[8]. In contexts of long lasting wars, like in Afghanistan, while labor market outcomes can improve when conflicts end, low levels of education are likely to leave a permanent "scar". This may lead to a deep poverty trap.

With regard to the econometric methodology, we use a Difference-in-Differences approach. The identification strategy relies on the fact that, depending on the year of birth and district of residence at the time education takes place, women were or were not exposed to the *Taliban* regime during school age. We denote "*school age*" a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*. In particular, during their regime the *Taliban* did not occupy the provinces of

[8] For the literature showing the importance of female human capital investment, see among others Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig and Vashishtha (1999), Geddes and Lueck (2002), Currie and Moretti (2003), Goldin (2006), and Doepke and Tertilt (2009).

Badakhshan, Kapisa, Panjsher and Takhar (see also Rashid, 2000). We estimate the following Difference-in-Differences equation:

$$1) \qquad s_{idt} = \alpha \; school\ age_t \; x \; district\ Taliban_d + \beta_d + \beta_t + \varepsilon_{idt}$$

where β_d and β_t are district and year of birth dummies, respectively. With regard to the variable s_{idt}, we consider four alternative dependent variables. First, the number of years of completed education. Second, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual completed nine grades of schooling, and zero otherwise. Third, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual can read and write[9]. Fourth, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual attended at least some formal school. In Equation 1, the ''*school age*'' and ''*district Taliban*'' dummy variables (not interacted between them) do not appear because they are linear combinations of the year of birth and district dummies, respectively.

Because we also look at the probability of having completed basic schooling, we restrict the sample of all regressions to women who are over 15 years at the time of the survey (*i.e.*, with year of birth≤1992). We estimate the Difference-in-Differences equation using the Linear Probability Model, which is appropriate in this context because the covariates are discrete[10]. We use sampling weights and cluster standard errors at the district level in all regressions of the paper.

The Difference-in-Differences estimator removes biases that could result from permanent differences in the outcomes of interest between the group of individuals in occupied districts and those in districts that were not occupied by the *Taliban*. Equation 1

[9] As the main report of the NRVA 2007/2008 documents (Icon-Institute, 2009), this round of the survey includes a request to the male household head and to the primary female household member to read a sentence from a flash card in order to check the (self-) reported literacy. Tested and self-reported literacy were remarkably similar, which suggests that literacy figures of the survey are likely to be reliable.

[10] Conditional expectation functions with discrete covariates can be parameterized as linear using a saturated model, regardless of the support of the dependent variable. Therefore, if the model is saturated then a linear model is no less appropriate for limited dependent variables than for other types of dependent variables. See, for instance, Angrist (2001).

also allows removing the biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group (*i.e.*, individuals in occupied districts) that could simply be the result of trends.

The key assumption of this strategy is that the schooling outcomes for the treatment and control groups would have to follow the same time trend in the absence of the *Taliban* regime. While this parallel trend assumption cannot be verified, below we provide a set of checks and placebo regressions that support it.

Table 2 presents results from the estimation of Equation 1. We restrict our sample to women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. We therefore focus on those who are born in or before 1992 (that is, those who are over 15 years old at the time of the survey). We consider the people who are born in or after 1976, because we want to exclude too dissimilar cohorts of birth from our sample. Consequently, for the four outcomes of interest, the regressions compare women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1980 (*i.e.*, women who were not aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power in Afghanistan) with women whose year of birth is 1981≤t≤1992 (*i.e.*, women who are over 15 years old at the time of the survey and, depending on their district of residence, might have had at least some exposure to the *Taliban* while they were aged 6-15).

While we will focus more on the mechanisms driving the relationship of interest in Section 4.4, the specifications of Table 2 allow to test whether the results are simply due to differences in post-2001 uncertainty associated to the war between districts that were occupied by the *Taliban* in the period 1996-2001, and districts that were not. In the even columns, we add an interaction term "*school age*$_t$ *x violence insurgents 2004-2007*$_d$", where "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is built using data on violent conflicts that were publicly released by WikiLeaks.org in July 2010[11]. These data are compiled from soldiers' field reports and include each event related to the Afghan conflict between 2004 and the end of

[11] The specifications do not include an interaction term between ''*district Taliban*'' and "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" because we condition on district dummies.

2009[12]. In particular, we consider the so-called "red events", which include violent events involving insurgents (attacks, direct or indirect fire and improvised explosive devices attacks, both where those devices were detonated and where they were found and disarmed by the authorities). For each district, we compute the sum of violent events in the period 2004-2007. This variable represents our measure of uncertainty that came after the collapse of the *Taliban* regime in 2001. In the specifications where we add the interaction term "*school age*$_t$ *x violence insurgents 2004-2007*$_d$", the estimated coefficient of the variable "*school age*$_t$ *x district Taliban*$_d$" gives us the effect of exposure to the *Taliban* during school age controlling for differences in post-2001 uncertainty associated to the violent events.

Table 2's results show that exposure to the *Taliban* during school age reduces women's education by about 0.82 years, if we condition on differences across districts in the number of violent events related to the post-2001 insurgency, and by about 0.87 years when we estimate the equation without controlling for the interaction term "*school age*$_t$ *x violence insurgents 2004-2007*$_d$". Moreover, women who were exposed to the *Taliban* government during school age are about 6 percentage points less likely to complete basic schooling than women who were not. When we consider as outcomes of interest the probability that the individual can read and write, and the probability that the individual has at least some formal education, the estimated difference between treated and control group is about 7 or 8 percentage points.

As we are going to discuss more in detail in Section 4.4.1, our results also show that post-2001 differences in violent events, between districts that were occupied by the *Taliban* during the period 1996-2001 and districts that were not, only explain a small fraction of the negative effect of the radical religious rule in Afghanistan on women's educational outcomes.

[12] See O' Loughlin *et al.* (2010) for a comparison between the WikiLeaks and the Armed Conflict Location Event (ACLED) data. There is a highly positive correlation between the two dataset, with the latter being a fraction of the former data.

4.1.1. Effects on education: Considering the different treatment intensity

We now present regressions where we consider the different treatment intensity. In the specifications whose results are in Table 2, either women were exposed to the *Taliban* during school age or were not. In reality, those who were aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power differ in the number of years they were exposed to the treatment. We have therefore estimated a model similar to Equation 1, in which the interaction term is built using the years of exposure to the *Taliban* during school age rather than the dummy variable "*School Age*". Findings from these regressions are in Table 3.

The estimates suggest that, for Afghan women, an additional year of exposure to the *Taliban* government during school age implies a reduction of about 0.15 years of education. The results in this table show no statistically significant difference driven by the violent events that followed the end of the *Taliban* government in 2001. Table 3 also suggests that the probabilities of completing basic education, of being literate and of having attended at least some formal school are about 1 percentage point lower because of an additional year of exposure to the *Taliban* government during school age. The results in Table 3 therefore confirm qualitatively the findings of Table 2.

4.2. Parallel trends assumption

The identifying assumption of the Difference-in-Differences strategy is that the schooling outcomes in districts that were occupied by the *Taliban*, and in districts that were not, would follow the same time trend in the absence of the *Taliban* government.

We start checking the validity of this assumption by representing graphically the averages of the schooling outcomes by cohort of birth in districts that were occupied by the *Taliban* and districts that were not (see Figure 1). When considering women who were not in school age during the *Taliban* government, *i.e.* those whose year of birth is $1976 \leq t \leq 1980$, the two depicted trends are relatively parallel and flat. Thus pre-treatment data show some confirmation that in the absence of the *Taliban* government the two groups would have

followed the same time trend. If we look at the cohorts of birth who might have been exposed to the *Taliban* during school age, *i.e.* women with year of birth 1981≤t≤1992, in both types of districts (occupied versus non-occupied in the period 1996-2001) younger women are more educated than women from earlier cohorts of birth. This is in line with a general tendency of an increase in human capital investment in the last decades. However, for the sub-sample of women who live in districts that were occupied by the *Taliban*, the slope is less steep, confirming the findings of Tables 2 and 3 that in Afghanistan exposure to the radical religious rule affected negatively female educational outcomes.

In the following sub-sections we conduct further checks showing support to the parallel trends assumption.

4.2.1. Verifying the parallel trends assumption. Using non-Pashtun districts only

The treatment and control groups are more likely to follow a common trend if we restrict our analysis to districts that are very similar in several dimensions, except the fact of being occupied by the *Taliban*. Clearly, one important dimension of heterogeneity of the Afghan districts is the ethnic composition of the population. As already mentioned, the *Taliban* members mostly belong to the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

Ethnic heterogeneity can represent a threat to our identification strategy if, for instance, the presence of Pashtun population in a district affected the probability of *Taliban* occupation. In this case, if culture affects education choices and the Afghan ethnic groups differ in cultural traits, then schooling outcomes in treatment and control districts would be unlikely to follow a common time trend in the absence of the treatment, the *Taliban* regime.

To check whether this represents an issue, in this sub-section we run regressions similar to those of Table 2, but considering women residing in non-Pashtun districts only. In particular, in these regressions we exclude both the districts where the population is entirely Pashtun and the ones where the population is a mix of Pashtun and other ethnicities. The

sources for the ethnicity data are the ethnic geography maps provided by the Program for Cultural and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) district profiles[13].

The results of the regressions with non-Pashtun districts only are reported in Table 4. The comparison of the estimates in this table with those in Table 2 suggests that our findings are robust to this check. The estimated coefficient of interest remains very similar when we condition on differences in uncertainty due to the war in the period 2004-2007[14].

The exercise in this sub-section, which confirms the robustness of our estimates, is useful for three reasons. First, the parallel trend assumption is more likely to hold given that we have considered districts that are very similar, except the fact that during their regime the *Taliban* did not occupy all the districts. Second, and more importantly, these results suggest that the main findings of this paper are not due to cultural differences among ethnic groups. Third, as we are going to discuss in detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.2, differences in the ethnic composition of the district population are likely to be among the main determinants of the probability for the district to be occupied by the *Taliban* during their government. Therefore results in Table 4 suggest that the relationship of interest is not driven by selection-into-treatment due to differences across districts in the ethnic composition of their population.

4.2.2. Verifying the parallel trends assumption. Placebo regressions and the provisional Islamist government of Burhanuddin Rabbani

In 1992, the Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah collapsed when the *Mujahideen* (warriors of God) took over Kabul. Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik with a Ph.D. in Islamic philosophy, became the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Its

[13] We thank Michael Gilligan for sharing these data with us.

[14] The mean value of "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is 8.97 for non-Pashtun districts that were not occupied by the *Taliban* and 13.07 violent events for non-Pashtun districts that were occupied during the *Taliban* rule.

government lasted until the *Taliban* regime started in 1996. In this sub-section, we present a placebo test that provides additional support to the parallel trends assumption.

The idea behind this robustness check is to estimate a Difference-in-Differences model similar to the one presented above, considering the schooling outcomes in districts that were later occupied by the *Taliban* and in districts that were not, but for women who were not in age 6-15 during the *Taliban* government.

In particular, in our placebo regressions we analyze whether exposure during school age to the provisional Islamist government of Burhanuddin Rabbani (from 1992 until the *Taliban* took the power in 1996) affected schooling outcomes differently in districts that were later occupied by the *Taliban* and districts that were not. Because this is a placebo test, we exclude from the regressions women who were exposed to the *Taliban* during age 6-15 (*i.e.*, we consider those with year of birth≤1980). We compare women exposed during school age to the provisional Islamist government of Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-1996) with women who were instead exposed to the Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah (1987-1992).

Table 5 presents the findings from these placebo tests. The coefficient of interest from these regressions is never statistically significant. In addition to support the common trends assumption, which is required for our identification strategy, these placebo regressions are particularly informative in this context. They show that the differences in schooling outcomes between districts later occupied by the *Taliban* and the remaining districts were not related to another important policy change, *i.e.* the introduction of an Islamist government in Afghanistan.

4.3. Selection into treatment

A possible concern is that the relationship between human capital investment and radical religious rule may be driven by selection-into-migration. This may happen if individuals

residing in occupied and non-occupied areas are very dissimilar in the presence of sorting across districts.

The selection into or out of the treatment group through internal migration, for instance, can be influenced by parental characteristics. While it is unlikely that households could foresee the *Taliban* regime 6-15 years before the *Taliban* were in power, and act strategically in their fertility decisions, it is theoretically plausible that parental characteristics influence the propensity of migration across districts. It is therefore important to evaluate how internal migration affects our estimates and whether parents' characteristics determine the selection into or out of treatment.

The NRVA survey only includes information on the current household of residence. This implies that we know the district of residence at the time of the survey, but not the one at the time the human capital investment takes place. We have information on whether the woman ever lived outside the district for at least 3 consecutive months in the 5 years before the survey. We exclude these internal migrants from the estimation sample of all regressions in the paper. Estimates in Table A1 – which can be compared to the specifications in Table 2 - show that results are qualitatively similar when we include migrants in the sample. This reassuring finding suggests that migration across districts is likely to have only a minor effect on our estimates.

For women who live at the time of the survey in the same household as their parents (*i.e.*, those women who have not formed their own families yet), we observe parents' education and age, which might be important determinants of the propensity to migrate. Using this sub-sample, we can directly test whether parental characteristics affect the selection into or out of treatment. In particular, we have run a regression with "*school age*$_t$ *x district Taliban*$_d$" as dependent variable, and father and mother's years of education and age as explanatory variables. We also condition on a rural residence dummy and variables related to inherited assets, which are proxies of wealth. Results from these regressions

including control variables gradually are in Table A2 in the appendix. Estimates show that these characteristics never explain the selection-into-treatment, regardless of the specification.

In addition to check whether selection into or out of treatment through internal migration affects our estimates, it is important to verify whether relevant pre-*Taliban* characteristics are biasing our results. In our context, one of the most important pre-radical religious rule district characteristics that are likely to have affected the probability of *Taliban* occupation (*i.e.* the selection into the radical religious rule) is the ethnic composition of the population. During their rule, the *Taliban* occupied 100% of the districts where the population is entirely Pashtun, 90% of the districts where the population is a mix of Pashtun and other ethnicities, and only a lower percentage, 78%, of the non-Pashtun districts. A possible reason why it was relatively easier for the *Taliban* to occupy the Pashtun districts rather than the non-Pashtun districts is that the *Taliban* and the Pashtun population share the same language and are often linked by kinship ties. The results of the regressions where we only consider women from non-Pashtun districts (see Table 4 and Section 4.2.1) allow ruling out that results of Table 2 are driven by perhaps the most relevant pre-*Taliban* districts characteristic, *i.e.* the ethnic composition of the population.

Finally, we have also run regressions similar to those of Table 2, where we condition on additional household characteristics. In particular, in Section 5 we present Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions where we analyze women's labor market outcomes and use exposure to the *Taliban* during school age as an instrument for education. In the first stage of these regressions (see Table A3), we condition on several variables. We also include variables related to inherited assets, which may hold constant some pre-*Taliban* differences in household characteristics. The results are robust to this further check.

4.4. Effects on education: Mechanisms

The negative relationship between exposure to the *Taliban* rule and women's educational outcomes can be related to several theoretical mechanisms. One obvious and clearly effective channel was the introduction of a ban on girls' education during the period 1996-2001, as we have documented in Section 2.2. We now try to assess whether other theoretical mechanisms explain the relationship of interest. In particular, we discuss 5 of such mechanisms that differ from the ban.

4.4.1. The role of uncertainty associated to the post-2001 insurgency

The districts that were occupied by the *Taliban* in the period 1996-2001 are also the districts where the level of uncertainty due to the violent events of the post-2001 insurgency was higher. The average value of "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" was 56.3 in occupied districts, versus 11.31 in districts that were not occupied. In principle, these violent conflicts might have affected human capital investment, as a growing literature shows[15]. Half of the regressions of Tables 2-4 condition on the number of violent events associated to the insurgency: therefore in these specifications our estimated coefficient of interest does not identify this effect. Comparing the conditional and unconditional estimates, the regressions in Table 2 inform us that the post-2001 violent conflicts explain about 5 percent of the total impact of exposure to the *Taliban* rule on educational outcomes[16]. Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the role of subsequent uncertainty and violent conflicts may be even smaller than 5% of the total impact.

4.4.2. The role of cultural differences among ethnic groups

The *Taliban* members mostly belong to the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, the Pashtun. The *Taliban* and the Pashtun population share the same language and are often linked by

[15] See, among others, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004), Akresh and de Walque (2011), Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011), Merrouche (2011), Miguel and Roland (2011), Shemyakina (2011), León (2012), Verwimp and Van Bavel (2013), and Di Maio and Nandi (2013).

[16] For instance, considering in Table 2 the coefficient of interest of the regressions with "years of education" as dependent variable, we compute the impact of this channel as follows: (0.871-0.821)/0.871=0.057.

kinship ties. As we have documented above, the ethnic composition of the district population is likely to have affected the probability for the district to be occupied by the *Taliban* during their government. If culture affects education choices and if Afghan ethnic groups differ in cultural traits, then schooling outcomes would differ not because of the radical religious rule but simply because of the ethnic composition of the population.

To analyze whether cultural differences among ethnic groups represent a relevant channel in explaining the relationship of interest, we compare the results in Tables 2 and 4. The estimation sample of the former table includes all the districts, while the regressions in the latter table are run using an estimation sample that includes women residing in non-Pashtun districts only. Results of the two tables are very similar, suggesting that cultural differences among ethnic groups do not explain the negative relationship between exposure to the *Taliban* rule and women's human capital investment.

4.4.3. The role of changes in health associated to the radical religious rule

Negative effects on female human capital investment could also be related to the *Taliban* policies that might have deteriorated women's health capital (see Sub-Section 2.2). This would happen because child health is likely to have a positive impact on educational outcomes (see Glewwe and Miguel, 2008 for a review of recent literature with a focus on less developing countries).

Estimates in Table A4 aim to check whether exposure to the *Taliban* rule has negatively affected women's health. In particular, in this table we report findings from regressions similar to the ones in Table 2, except that we consider several health measures as dependent variables. We use the information we have on whether the woman has difficulty seeing (even wearing glasses), hearing (even if using a hearing aid), walking or climbing steps, remembering or concentrating, and difficulty with self-care such as washing all over or dressing.

With regard to hearing, walking and dressing, exposure to the *Taliban* during school age has no statistically significant effect on the health outcome. Instead, women who were exposed to the *Taliban* rule during school age (6-15 years old) have a lower probability of having difficulty seeing and remembering than women who were not (*i.e.*, older cohorts in the context of this paper's estimation sample, which includes women whose year of birth is $1976 \leq t \leq 1992$). As a consequence that the treatment is not associated with deterioration in health, this channel is therefore unlikely to explain the negative relationship between exposure to the radical religious rule and women's human capital investment.

4.4.4. The role of the introduction of an Islamist government

One may wonder whether the findings in Tables 2-4 are not caused by religious radicalism, but are simply due to the introduction of an Islamist government. Along these lines, Cooray and Potrafke (2011) show association between gender inequality in education, on the one hand, and culture and religion, on the other hand, with discrimination against girls being especially pronounced in Muslim dominated countries. Using cross-country data, Norton and Tomal (2009) show the existence of a negative link between female educational attainment and the proportion of Muslim adherents in a country, with similar results for the gender gap. Kuran (2004) argues that deficiencies of human capital are rooted in applications of Islamic law. The traditional Islamic institutions that worked well in earlier centuries became the sources of inefficiency in the modern globalized world, and this decreased the return to investment in education in Muslim countries[17].

In Section 4.2.2, we have shown that the provisional Islamist government of Burhanuddin Rabbani that followed the collapse of the Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah and came before the *Taliban* government had no effect in reducing

[17] For the literature exploring the effects of other religions on schooling and/or gender inequalities in education, see Botticini and Eckstein (2005; 2007), Becker and Woessmann (2008), Becker and Woessmann (2009), and Becker and Woessmann (2010).

human capital investment. Therefore we can exclude that introduction of an Islamist government in Afghanistan is the mechanism driving the results in Tables 2-4.

4.4.5. The role of labor market changes

Another potential mechanism acts through the labor market. In the 1996-2001 period, women were also largely prohibited from working, which influenced negatively their labor market experience and subsequent expectations on the returns to education. While our data do not allow analyzing how the radical religious rule affected women's expectations on the returns to education, we can investigate the labor market consequences.

Before turning to this topic and as a summary of Section 4.4, the main mechanism driving the negative relationship between exposure to the *Taliban* and women's education in Tables 2-4 is likely to be the ban on girls' education during the period 1996-2001 and not the 4 other channels that we have presented above.

5. Effects of the *Taliban* government on women's labor market outcomes

We now turn our attention to the consequences of the *Taliban* rule in Afghanistan on women's labor market outcomes. As outcomes of interest, we consider the following six dummy variables: a dummy equal to 1 in case of labor force participation (zero otherwise), if the woman has a wage work[18], if she is an unpaid family worker, if she has an employment outside the household, if she has an agricultural employment within the household and if she has a non-agricultural employment within the household. The information we have therefore allows distinguishing between employment within or outside the household. This distinction is important for a broader analysis of how exposure to the radical religious rule has affected the emancipation of Afghan women.

[18] This dummy takes the value of 0 in case the woman is an unpaid family worker, self-employed or unemployed. As the descriptive statistics in Table 1 show, only 2% of women hold a job for which they receive a wage. This makes the potential analysis of the *Taliban* rule on the wage level unreliable, given that the regressions would only include few hundred observations. For this reason, rather than considering the wage level, among the dependent variables we use a dummy equal to 1 if the woman holds a wage job, 0 otherwise.

All specifications condition on the following variables: a dummy equal to 1 if the woman is married (0 otherwise), the number of children who are younger and older than 2 years, a rural residence dummy variable, and, as proxies of wealth, two dummies equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited irrigated land and/or inherited dwelling by any of the household members.

We present two sets of regressions, which imply two very different assumptions. In the first set of regressions – whose results are in Table 6 – we employ the Instrumental Variable estimator, and use exposure to the *Taliban* during school age as an instrument for women's years of education. These regressions assume that exposure to the *Taliban* during school age only impact labor market outcomes through their effects on education. For sake of comparison, in this table we present as well the OLS regressions, where we do not correct for the endogeneity of the education variable.

In the second set of regressions, we instead examine the "reduced form" effect of exposure to the *Taliban* during school age on women's labor market outcomes. In particular, Table 7 reports results of specifications similar to the OLS estimates in Table 6, except that the education variable is now replaced by the interaction term *school age*$_t$ *x District Taliban*$_d$. The assumption behind this alternative approach is that exposure to the *Taliban* during school age may affect labor market outcomes through education, and through other mechanisms as well. This assumption would raise a concern regarding the validity of the exclusion restriction for the IV estimator of Table 6. As a consequence, instrumenting for just one of several mechanisms with exposure to the radical religious rule would lead to biased IV estimates of the effect of education on labor market outcomes.

While it is interesting to compare the results of these two tables, our preferred estimates are those in Table 7. In the context of this paper, the latter table is informative because the question of interest is the analysis of the consequences of the *Taliban* rule rather than the effects of education on labor market outcomes.

Focusing on Table 6 (and if we are ready to assume that the exclusion restriction holds), the IV estimates suggest that the only outcome of interest that is influenced by education in a statistically significant way is the probability of being employed outside the household. More precisely, for Afghan women an additional year of education implies a 1.8 percentage point higher probability of being employed outside the household. The corresponding OLS estimate is statistically significant as well and shows a smaller positive effect (about 1 percentage point). For the other outcomes of interest, the effect is statistically zero according to the IV estimates, while the OLS regressions show a statistically significant effect when we consider as dependent variables the likelihood of holding a wage work, of being an unpaid family worker, and having an agricultural or a non-agricultural employment within the household. The signs of these effects are in line with what we expected, if we consider that education may allow women to switch from employment within the household to employment outside the household. With regard to the control variables, Table 6 shows that women who are in households with inherited irrigated land (*i.e.* wealthier households) are about 4 percentage points more likely than women whose households do not own inherited land to participate in the labor force, to be an unpaid family worker and to have an agricultural employment within the household.

In Table A5, we check the robustness of the IV estimates of Table 6 by adding as control variable the interaction term *school* age_t *x violence insurgents 2004-2007*$_d$. This additional control makes the exclusion restriction more likely to hold. Results from this check confirm the findings in Table 6. Education has a statistically significant and positive effect on the likelihood that the woman is employed outside the household. The estimated coefficient is almost identical to the one reported in Table 6. With regard to the interaction term *school* age_t *x violence insurgents 2004-2007*$_d$, its estimated coefficient is not statistically significant in any of the specifications of Table A5.

The estimates in Section 4 have already shown how being of school age during the *Taliban* government negatively decreases women's years of education. Table 6 additionally

informs us that the first-stage F-stat of the IV regressions is larger than 10, which confirms that we are using a strong instrument, according to Staiger and Stock's (1997) rule of thumb. The complete first-stage regressions are in Table A3. They show how our findings of Section 4 are robust when we also condition on a larger set of control variables.

Table 7 presents results of the reduced form regressions in which we replace the education variable (*i.e.*, the main explanatory variable in Table 6) with the interaction term *school age$_t$ x district Taliban$_d$*. These are our preferred specifications because we believe that exposure to the radical religious rule is likely to impact on labor market outcomes through several channels. As we have explained before, the estimates in Table 7 are informative because our research question is not the relationship between education and labor market outcomes, but the analyses of the consequences of being exposed to a radical religious rule. The specifications whose results are in the even columns control for the term *school age$_t$ x violence insurgents 2004-2007$_d$*. Results in these columns therefore allow identifying the coefficient of interest when we hold constant the uncertainty associated to violent events of the post-2001 insurgency.

The two most robust results in Table 7 concern the regressions with, as dependent variable, the likelihood for women of being employed outside the household and of being employed in agriculture within the household. With regard to the former dependent variable, the estimates are very similar to those shown in Table 6. Being exposed to the *Taliban* rule during school age implies a 1.4 percentage point reduction of the probability of being employed outside the household, controlling for the level of violent events in the districts at the time of the survey. The effect is larger when we consider as outcome of interest the likelihood of being employed in agriculture within the family: more precisely, women who were exposed to the radical religious rule during school age are about 6.7 percentage points more likely to have an agricultural job within their household than non-exposed women. In the corresponding IV estimates of Tables 6 and A5, the effect of education on the probability of being employed in agriculture within the household was imprecisely estimated. Table 7

also shows that when we do not condition on the interaction term *school age$_t$ x violence insurgents 2004-2007$_d$*, exposure to the *Taliban* rule implies a 6 percentage points higher probability for women of being unpaid family workers.

6. How different is Kabul?

We now try to assess whether the consequences of the *Taliban* government were different in Kabul. There are several reasons to think so. First, with regard to human capital investment, during the period of the *Taliban* ban on girls' education it was less costly to organize informal schooling in the capital of Afghanistan than in other areas, because Kabul has a higher population density. Second, there are also large differences between the labor market in Kabul and the one in other districts, especially rural areas. Among these differences, the Afghan capital offers more opportunities of wage work and non-agricultural employment. Third, as Rashid (2000) documents, during their rule the *Taliban* enforced restrictions more strictly in Kabul than in other districts. These differences in enforcement level can be explained using rational club models where voluntary religious organizations are efficient providers of local public goods and their destructive behavior, such as the subjugation of women and harassment of non-members, can be interpreted as an attempt to lower the outside option of a defector (see Berman, 2009, among others).

6.1. Effects of the *Taliban* government on women's educational outcomes in Kabul

To understand how different the educational consequences of the *Taliban* rule are in Kabul, we estimate a specification similar to the one whose results are in Table 2, except that we include an additional interaction term: *school age x district Taliban x Kabul* [19]. The estimated coefficient of this variable allows assessing whether the consequences of the *Taliban* rule were different in Kabul from other occupied districts.

[19] Given that the *Taliban* occupied Kabul, the interaction terms *school age x Kabul* and *school age x district Taliban x Kabul* are identical.

Estimates are in Table 8 and suggest that the educational consequences of the *Taliban* government were negative in Kabul as well, but of smaller magnitude (that is, less severe) if compared with other occupied districts. In particular, exposure to the *Taliban* during school age implies a reduction of about 0.853-0.277=0.576 (0.853) years of education for women in the Afghan capital (in other occupied districts), compared to women in non-occupied districts (see column 2 of Table 8). When we consider literacy ability, exposure to the radical religious rule during school age makes the likelihood that women in Kabul can read and write about 4 percentage point lower (-0.074+0.033=-0.041) than in non-occupied districts. This difference is larger in absolute value - 7.4 percentage points - when we compare women in all the other occupied districts with women in the non-occupied districts (see column 6). Similarly, because of the radical religious rule, women in Kabul have a probability to have at least some formal education that is about 1.5 percentage points (-0.087+0.072) lower than women in non-occupied districts. For women in other occupied districts, the gap in this schooling indicator is as large as 8.7 percentage points (see column 8). With regard to the probability of completing basic education, exposure to the *Taliban* during school age affects similarly Kabul and other occupied districts, implying a 6 percentage points lower probability of completing basic schooling compared with women in non-occupied districts (see column 4).

To summarize the findings of this section, the educational consequences of the *Taliban* government were negative in Kabul as well as in other occupied districts, but in the Afghan capital these effects were less severe than in other occupied districts. A possible explanation for this result is that, because of the higher population density, it was less costly to organize informal education in the Afghan capital than in other areas.

6.2. **Effects of the *Taliban* government on women's labor market outcomes in Kabul**

Results in Table 9 help to understand whether the consequences of the radical religious rule in Afghanistan on women's labor market outcomes were different in Kabul from other occupied districts. We report results concerning the "reduced form" effect of the *Taliban* rule, which we believe are our most plausible estimates given that in addition to changes in educational outcomes there might be other channels driving the relationship of interest. In the even columns, we condition on differences in uncertainty deriving from the post-2001 insurgency by controlling for the variable *school age*$_t$ *x violence insurgents 2004-2007*$_d$.

We find statistically significant results for several coefficients of interest. Exposure to the treatment during school age implies a likelihood of participating to the labor force for women in Kabul that is 4 percentage points higher than for women in non-occupied districts. In other occupied districts, the effect of the radical religious rule on this outcome of interest is not statistically different when compared to the one in non-occupied districts (column 2). The estimates in Table 9 also show that, because of the *Taliban* government, women in Kabul have a higher probability of being unpaid family workers (more precisely, 6 percentage points higher than in non-occupied districts, see column 6) and of agricultural employment within the household (8.5+5.8=14.3 percentage points higher than in non-occupied districts, see column 10). Exposure to the treatment has a statistically identical effect for women in other (than Kabul) occupied districts and non-occupied districts when we consider as dependent variable the likelihood of being an unpaid family worker, while the impact is 5.8 percentage points higher for women in other occupied districts than in non-occupied districts if the outcome of interest is the probability of holding an agricultural employment within the household.

Another robust effect of exposure to the radical religious rule during school age is a 2 percentage points lower subsequent probability to have a wage work for women in Kabul than for women in non-occupied districts (see column 4 of Table 9). The effect of the *Taliban* rule on this outcome of interest is statistically identical when comparing other (than Kabul) occupied districts and non-occupied districts. Moreover, we find that exposure to the

treatment implies a probability of employment outside the household that is 1.8+1.2=3 percentage points (1.2 percentage points) lower for women in Kabul (in other occupied districts) than for women in non-occupied districts (see column 8). With regard to the probability of having a non-agricultural employment within the household, women in Kabul, in other occupied districts and non-occupied districts have outcomes that are influenced by the radical religious rule in a statistically identical way.

To summarize the results in this section, it seems that especially in Kabul exposure to the *Taliban* rule during school age implies a switch at the time of the survey away from wage works and employment outside the household to unpaid family occupations and agricultural employment within the household. Two different arguments can explain these results concerning the Afghan capital. The first reason is simply related to differences in the labor market. The broader availability of wage-jobs and employment outside the household implies that a larger share of women exposed to the *Taliban* rule during school age could switch from these types of occupations to employment within the household, especially in the agricultural sector as unpaid family workers. The second reason for this larger (in absolute value) effect for women in Kabul is that, as Rashid (2000) documents, the *Taliban* enforced restrictions more strictly in the Afghan capital than in other districts. This is also in line with the predictions of rational club models where voluntary religious organizations are local providers of public goods and the subjugation of women or other destructive behavior may be an attempt to lower the outside option of potential defectors (see Berman and Laitin, 2008, and Berman, 2009). A result that is robust for other (than Kabul) occupied districts as well is the switch from employment outside the household to agricultural employment within the household.

7. **Concluding remarks**

The economic theory of radical religious clubs predicts that voluntary religious organizations providing local public services may rationally choose a disruptive behavior in

order to lower the outside option of members' defection (see Berman and Laitin, 2008, and Berman, 2009). Our paper has analyzed the consequences of an example of such behavior, the subjugation of women by the *Taliban*, a religious group that ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001.

In this paper, we have quantified the effect on women's human capital investment of the ban on girls' education introduced during the radical religious rule in Afghanistan. Our estimates suggest that women who were exposed to the *Taliban* government during school age are about 6 percentage points less likely to complete basic education than women who were not. Our empirical strategy allows to show that this negative effect was due to the introduction of the ban, and to discard other potential mechanisms such as the introduction in 1992 of the provisional Islamist government that came before the *Taliban*, cultural differences related to ethnicity or differences across districts in the number of violent events (and therefore uncertainty) of the post-2001 insurgency. The negative effect of exposure to the treatment on women's educational outcome is of smaller magnitude in the Afghan capital, Kabul, where the higher population density made less costly the provision of informal schooling.

We have also explored the consequences of the *Taliban* government on women's labor market outcomes. Our results show how exposure to the radical religious rule during school age implies a subsequent switch for women from employment outside the household to agricultural employment within the household. This finding has clear consequences for the emancipation of Afghan women. The effects on labor market outcomes are larger in Kabul, probably because its labor market is very different from the one of other provinces and because of the stricter restrictions imposed by the *Taliban* on women in the Afghan capital (see Rashid, 2000).

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Tables

Table 1 - Education and labor market outcomes: Descriptive statistics.

	women	men
years of education	1.29	3.99
	[3.2]	[4.78]
completed 9 grades of schooling	0.07	0.23
	[0.25]	[0.42]
can read and write	0.15	0.47
	[0.36]	[0.5]
at least some formal school	0.16	0.47
	[0.37]	[0.5]
labor force participation	0.45	0.79
	[0.5]	[0.41]
wage work	0.02	0.24
	[0.13]	[0.43]
unpaid family worker	0.32	0.11
	[0.47]	[0.32]
employment external to the household	0.01	0.17
	[0.12]	[0.37]
agricultural employment within the household	0.36	0.41
	[0.48]	[0.49]
non-agricultural employment within the household	0.1	0.24
	[0.3]	[0.42]

Note. Source: National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/2008 Survey. This table contains sample means and, in brackets, standard deviations. Descriptive statistics on women's education and labor market outcomes refer to the estimation samples of Tables 2 and 6, respectively. Descriptive statistics for men refer to individuals of similar age.

Table 2 - Difference-in-Differences estimation of the effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on schooling outcomes of women.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	years of education		completed 9 grades of schooling		can read and write		at least some formal school	
school age x district Taliban	-0.871***	-0.821***	-0.064***	-0.061***	-0.078***	-0.070***	-0.084***	-0.079***
	[0.234]	[0.236]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.025]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		-0.089**		-0.004		-0.015***		-0.009
		[0.045]		[0.003]		[0.005]		[0.008]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,169	19,169	19,170	19,170	19,171	19,171	19,171	19,171
R-squared	0.274	0.275	0.179	0.179	0.251	0.252	0.291	0.291

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*completed 9 grades of schooling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman completed nine grades of schooling, 0 otherwise. "*can read and write*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman can read and write, 0 otherwise. "*at least some formal school*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman attended at least some formal school, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table 3 - Difference-in-Differences estimation of the effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on schooling outcomes of women. Considering different treatment intensity.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	years of education		completed 9 grades of schooling		can read and write		at least some formal school	
years exposure x district Taliban	-0.158***	-0.148***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.015***	-0.013***	-0.015***	-0.014***
	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]
years exposure x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		-0.018		-0.001		-0.002		-0.002
		[0.012]		[0.001]		[0.002]		[0.002]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,169	19,169	19,170	19,170	19,171	19,171	19,171	19,171
R-squared	0.274	0.275	0.179	0.179	0.251	0.252	0.291	0.291

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*years exposure*" is the number of years the woman was exposed to the *Taliban* rule while she was aged 6-15. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*completed 9 grades of schooling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman completed nine grades of schooling, 0 otherwise. "*can read and write*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman can read and write, 0 otherwise. "*at least some formal school*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman attended at least some formal school, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table 4 - Difference-in-Differences estimation of the effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on schooling outcomes of women. Using information on individuals residing in non-Pashtun districts only.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	years of education		completed 9 grades of schooling		can read and write		at least some formal school	
school age x district Taliban	-0.866**	-0.846**	-0.066**	-0.063**	-0.082**	-0.081**	-0.088**	-0.087**
	[0.350]	[0.347]	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.035]	[0.035]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		-0.566*		-0.075***		-0.021		-0.018
		[0.316]		[0.024]		[0.044]		[0.040]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	7,222	7,222	7,223	7,223	7,224	7,224	7,223	7,223
R-squared	0.240	0.240	0.153	0.154	0.236	0.236	0.263	0.263

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*completed 9 grades of schooling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman completed nine grades of schooling, 0 otherwise. "*can read and write*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman can read and write, 0 otherwise. "*at least some formal school*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman attended at least some formal school, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table 5 - Placebo regressions and exposure to the provisional Islamist government under Burhanuddin Rabbani (1992-1996).

	(1) years of education	(2) completed 9 grades of schooling	(3) can read and write	(4) at least some formal school
cohort of birth 1977-1980 x district Taliban	0.056 [0.102]	0.002 [0.009]	0.020 [0.019]	0.010 [0.016]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	7,707	7,707	7,707	7,707
R-squared	0.212	0.164	0.180	0.213

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1972≤t≤1980. "*cohort of birth 1977-1980*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was born between 1977 and 1980, 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*completed 9 grades of schooling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman completed nine grades of schooling, 0 otherwise. "*can read and write*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman can read and write, 0 otherwise. "*at least some formal school*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman attended at least some formal school, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table 6 - Years of education and women's labor market outcomes. Using exposure to the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) as IV.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	labor force participation		wage work		unpaid family worker		employment external to the household		agricultural employment within the household		non-agricultural employment within the household	
	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
years of education	0.003	-0.070	0.010***	0.010	-0.005**	-0.074	0.009***	0.018**	-0.005**	-0.090	-0.003**	-0.005
	[0.003]	[0.054]	[0.001]	[0.010]	[0.002]	[0.053]	[0.001]	[0.008]	[0.002]	[0.057]	[0.001]	[0.017]
married	-0.039***	-0.133*	-0.010***	-0.010	0.012	-0.077	-0.005*	0.006	0.016	-0.094	-0.054***	-0.057***
	[0.014]	[0.079]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.079]	[0.003]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.087]	[0.008]	[0.022]
# of children younger than 2 (/10)	-0.000	-0.094	-0.026	-0.026	0.170**	0.082	-0.019	-0.007	0.116*	0.007	-0.098***	-0.101**
	[0.076]	[0.119]	[0.018]	[0.021]	[0.068]	[0.111]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.069]	[0.119]	[0.036]	[0.041]
# of children older than 2 (/10)	0.153***	0.051	-0.061***	-0.061***	0.232***	0.137	-0.048**	-0.036**	0.249***	0.132	0.002	-0.001
	[0.055]	[0.134]	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.038]	[0.114]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.038]	[0.127]	[0.019]	[0.027]
rural	0.155***	-0.023	0.006	0.007	0.144***	-0.024	-0.009	0.013	0.154***	-0.052	0.005	0.000
	[0.041]	[0.135]	[0.007]	[0.024]	[0.032]	[0.131]	[0.007]	[0.021]	[0.039]	[0.144]	[0.035]	[0.056]
inherited irrigated land	0.036***	0.046***	-0.004	-0.004	0.036***	0.045***	-0.000	-0.002	0.035***	0.047***	0.003	0.003
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.007]	[0.007]
inherited dwelling	-0.016	-0.022*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.008	-0.013	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.005	-0.010	-0.011
	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.007]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,088	19,088	19,088	19,088	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,087
First-stage F stat		12.87		12.87		12.87		12.87		12.87		12.87
R-squared	0.315	0.150	0.114	0.114	0.352	0.178	0.116	0.069	0.383	0.138	0.292	0.291

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*married*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is married, 0 otherwise. "*# of children younger than 2*" is the number of children who are younger than 2 years. "*# of children older than 2*" is the number of children who are older than 2 years. "*rural*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resides in a rural area, 0 otherwise. "*inherited irrigated* land" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited irrigated land by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*inherited dwelling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited dwelling by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*labor force participation*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case the woman participates to the labor force, 0 otherwise. "*wage work*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a wage work, 0 otherwise. "*unpaid family worker*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is an unpaid family worker, 0 otherwise. "*employment external to the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an employment outside the household, 0 otherwise. "*agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an agricultural job within the household, 0 otherwise. "*non-agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a non-agricultural job within the household, 0 otherwise. In the IV regressions, the endogenous regressor is "*years of education*" and the instrumental variable is "*school age x district Taliban*", *i.e.* a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the woman was exposed to the *Taliban* rule during school age, 0 otherwise. The two variables that are interacted to build the instrumental variable are: "*school age*", which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise; and "*district Taliban*", which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table 7 - The reduced form effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on women's labor market outcomes.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	labor force participation		wage work		unpaid family worker		employment external to the household		agricultural employment within the household		non-agricultural employment within the household	
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
school age x district Taliban	0.058	0.057	-0.008	-0.007	0.061*	0.052	-0.015**	-0.014**	0.074**	0.067**	0.004	0.006
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.036]	[0.035]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.035]	[0.034]	[0.013]	[0.014]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		0.002		-0.002		0.015		-0.002		0.013		-0.004
		[0.008]		[0.003]		[0.010]		[0.002]		[0.011]		[0.004]
married	-0.043***	-0.043***	-0.023***	-0.023***	0.018	0.019	-0.017***	-0.017***	0.023*	0.023*	-0.050***	-0.050***
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.009]	[0.009]
# of children younger than 2 (/10)	-0.006	-0.007	-0.038**	-0.038**	0.174**	0.171**	-0.030**	-0.030**	0.120*	0.118*	-0.095***	-0.094***
	[0.078]	[0.078]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.068]	[0.068]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.070]	[0.070]	[0.036]	[0.036]
# of children older than 2 (/10)	0.147**	0.147**	-0.074***	-0.074***	0.237***	0.237***	-0.061**	-0.061**	0.254***	0.254***	0.006	0.006
	[0.059]	[0.059]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.018]	[0.018]
rural	0.147***	0.147***	-0.017***	-0.017***	0.156***	0.155***	-0.032***	-0.031***	0.167***	0.166***	0.012	0.012
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.039]	[0.039]	[0.036]	[0.036]
inherited irrigated land	0.036***	0.036***	-0.003	-0.003	0.036***	0.036***	0.001	0.001	0.035***	0.035***	0.003	0.003
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.007]	[0.007]
inherited dwelling	-0.016	-0.016	-0.002	-0.002	-0.007	-0.007	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.010	-0.010
	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.008]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,088	19,088	19,088	19,088	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,087
R-squared	0.315	0.315	0.072	0.072	0.352	0.352	0.062	0.062	0.382	0.382	0.291	0.291

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*married*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is married, 0 otherwise. "*# of children younger than 2*" is the number of children who are younger than 2 years. "*# of children older than 2*" is the number of children who are older than 2 years. "*rural*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resides in a rural area. "*inherited irrigated* land" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited irrigated land by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*inherited dwelling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited dwelling by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*labor force participation*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case the woman participates to the labor force, 0 otherwise. "*wage work*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a wage work, 0 otherwise. "*unpaid family worker*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is an unpaid family worker, 0 otherwise. "*employment external to the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an employment outside the household, 0 otherwise. "*agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an agricultural job within the household, 0 otherwise. "*non-agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a non-agricultural job within the household. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table 8 - The effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on women's schooling outcomes in Kabul.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	years of education		completed 9 grades of schooling		can read and write		at least some formal school	
school age x district Taliban x Kabul	0.209*	0.277**	-0.001	0.002	0.023*	0.033**	0.063***	0.072***
	[0.112]	[0.118]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.018]
school age x district Taliban	-0.902***	-0.853***	-0.064***	-0.062***	-0.082***	-0.074***	-0.094***	-0.087***
	[0.236]	[0.238]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.025]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		-0.108***		-0.005*		-0.017***		-0.014***
		[0.037]		[0.003]		[0.004]		[0.005]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes				
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes				
Observations	19,169	19,169	19,170	19,170	19,171	19,171	19,171	19,171
R-squared	0.275	0.275	0.179	0.179	0.251	0.252	0.291	0.292

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*Kabul*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in Kabul, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*completed 9 grades of schooling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman completed nine grades of schooling, 0 otherwise. "*can read and write*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman can read and write, 0 otherwise. "*at least some formal school*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman attended at least some formal school, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table 9 - The effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on women's labor market outcomes in Kabul.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	labor force participation		wage work		unpaid family worker		employment external to the household		agricultural employment within the household		non-agricultural employment within the household	
school age x district Taliban x Kabul	0.042*	0.043*	-0.023***	-0.023***	0.067**	0.060*	-0.019***	-0.018***	0.089***	0.085***	-0.002	0.001
	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.033]	[0.031]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.009]	[0.009]
school age x district Taliban	0.051	0.052	-0.005	-0.004	0.051	0.046	-0.012*	-0.012*	0.061*	0.058*	0.004	0.006
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.014]	[0.014]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		-0.001		-0.000		0.011		-0.001		0.007		-0.004
		[0.008]		[0.002]		[0.009]		[0.001]		[0.008]		[0.003]
married	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.023***	-0.023***	0.020*	0.020*	-0.018***	-0.018***	0.025**	0.025**	-0.050***	-0.050***
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.009]
# of children younger than 2 (/10)	-0.007	-0.007	-0.038**	-0.038**	0.172**	0.171**	-0.030**	-0.030**	0.118*	0.117*	-0.095***	-0.094***
	[0.078]	[0.078]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.070]	[0.070]	[0.036]	[0.036]
# of children older than 2 (/10)	0.144**	0.144**	-0.073***	-0.073***	0.234***	0.234***	-0.060**	-0.060**	0.250***	0.250***	0.006	0.006
	[0.061]	[0.061]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.039]	[0.039]	[0.018]	[0.018]
rural	0.147***	0.147***	-0.017***	-0.017***	0.155***	0.155***	-0.031***	-0.031***	0.166***	0.166***	0.012	0.012
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.039]	[0.039]	[0.036]	[0.036]
inherited irrigated land	0.037***	0.037***	-0.003	-0.003	0.036***	0.036***	0.001	0.001	0.035***	0.036***	0.003	0.003
	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.007]	[0.007]
inherited dwelling	-0.016	-0.016	-0.002	-0.002	-0.007	-0.007	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	0.002	-0.010	-0.010
	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.008]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,088	19,088	19,088	19,088	19,087	19,087	19,087	19,087
R-squared	0.316	0.316	0.073	0.073	0.352	0.352	0.062	0.062	0.383	0.383	0.291	0.291

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*Kabul*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in Kabul, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*married*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is married, 0 otherwise. "*# of children younger than 2*" is the number of children who are younger than 2 years. "*# of children older than 2*" is the number of children who are older than 2 years. "*rural*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resides in a rural area, 0 otherwise. "*inherited irrigated* land" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited irrigated land by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*inherited dwelling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited dwelling by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*labor force participation*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case the woman participates to the labor force, 0 otherwise. "*wage work*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a wage work, 0 otherwise. "*unpaid family worker*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is an unpaid family worker, 0 otherwise. "*employment external to the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an employment outside the household, 0 otherwise. "*agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an agricultural job within the household, 0 otherwise. "*non-agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a non-agricultural job within the household, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Figure 1 - Average schooling outcomes by cohort of birth in districts that were occupied by the *Taliban* and districts that were not.



Table A1 - Difference-in-Differences estimation of the effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on schooling outcomes of women. Including internal migrants in the estimation sample.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	years of education		completed 9 grades of schooling		can read and write		at least some formal school	
school age x district Taliban	-0.827***	-0.777***	-0.062***	-0.060***	-0.073***	-0.065**	-0.078***	-0.073***
	[0.231]	[0.233]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		-0.088*		-0.004		-0.015***		-0.010
		[0.048]		[0.003]		[0.006]		[0.008]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,904	19,904	19,905	19,905	19,906	19,906	19,906	19,906
R-squared	0.275	0.275	0.178	0.178	0.249	0.249	0.292	0.293

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*completed 9 grades of schooling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman completed nine grades of schooling, 0 otherwise. "*can read and write*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman can read and write, 0 otherwise. "*at least some formal school*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman attended at least some formal school, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table A2 – Selection into treatment.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	school age x district Taliban				
father's years of education (/100)	-0.015	-0.017	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.015]
mother's years of education (/100)	0.013	0.015	0.015	0.016	0.015
	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.014]
father's age (/100)		-0.013	-0.030	-0.029	-0.031
		[0.009]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.033]
mother's age (/100)		0.020	-0.047	-0.047	-0.049
		[0.013]	[0.046]	[0.046]	[0.046]
father's age (/100) squared			0.015	0.015	0.016
			[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.031]
mother's age (/100) squared			0.070	0.069	0.071
			[0.055]	[0.055]	[0.056]
rural				0.001	0.001
				[0.002]	[0.002]
inherited irrigated land					0.001
					[0.001]
inherited dwelling					-0.001
					[0.001]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	5,115	5,112	5,112	5,112	5,109
R-squared	0.984	0.984	0.984	0.984	0.984

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*rural*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resides in a rural area, 0 otherwise. "*inherited irrigated* land" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited irrigated land by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*inherited dwelling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited dwelling by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table A3 – First-stage regressions of IV estimates in Tables 6 and A5.

	(1)	(2)
	years of education	
school age x district Taliban	-0.820***	-0.779***
	[0.229]	[0.231]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		-0.074*
		[0.040]
married	-1.292***	-1.293***
	[0.238]	[0.238]
# of children younger than 2 (/10)	-1.242**	-1.232**
	[0.480]	[0.482]
# of children older than 2 (/10)	-1.350**	-1.349**
	[0.649]	[0.646]
rural	-2.422***	-2.419***
	[0.273]	[0.274]
inherited irrigated land	0.132	0.131
	[0.082]	[0.082]
inherited dwelling	-0.078	-0.077
	[0.062]	[0.062]
district dummies	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes
Observations	19,088	19,088
R-squared	0.320	0.320

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*married*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is married, 0 otherwise. "*# of children younger than 2*" is the number of children who are younger than 2 years. "*# of children older than 2*" is the number of children who are older than 2 years. "*rural*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resides in a rural area, 0 otherwise. "*inherited irrigated* land" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited irrigated land by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*inherited dwelling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited dwelling by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table A4 - The effect of the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) on women's health.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	difficulty seeing		difficulty hearing		difficulty walking		difficulty washing and dressing		difficulty remembering and concentrating	
school age x district Taliban	-0.009***	-0.010***	0.001	-0.0004	-0.003	-0.005	-0.002	-0.002	-0.008**	-0.009**
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)		0.001		0.002		0.003*		-0.000		0.001
		[0.001]		[0.002]		[0.002]		[0.001]		[0.002]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,176	19,176	19,172	19,172	19,173	19,173	19,173	19,173	19,158	19,158
R-squared	0.028	0.028	0.041	0.041	0.042	0.042	0.024	0.024	0.058	0.058

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*district Taliban*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*difficulty seeing*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has difficulty seeing (even wearing glasses), 0 otherwise. "*difficulty hearing*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has difficulty hearing (even if using a hearing aid), 0 otherwise. "*difficulty walking*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has difficulty walking or climbing steps, 0 otherwise. "*difficulty washing and dressing*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has difficulty with self-care such as washing all over or dressing, 0 otherwise. "*difficulty remembering and concentrating*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has difficulty remembering or concentrating, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.

Table A5 - Years of education and women's labor market outcomes. Using exposure to the *Taliban* government (1996-2001) as IV and controlling for differences in uncertainty associated to the post-2001 insurgency.

	(1) labor force participation IV	(2) wage work IV	(3) unpaid family worker IV	(4) employment external to the household IV	(5) agricultural employment within the household IV	(6) non-agricultural employment within the household IV
years of education	-0.073	0.009	-0.067	0.017**	-0.086	-0.008
	[0.057]	[0.010]	[0.054]	[0.008]	[0.058]	[0.018]
school age x (violence insurgents 2004-2007/100)	-0.004	-0.001	0.010	-0.001	0.006	-0.005
	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.012]	[0.004]
married	-0.137*	-0.011	-0.069	0.005	-0.088	-0.061**
	[0.082]	[0.012]	[0.077]	[0.011]	[0.085]	[0.024]
# of children younger than 2 (/10)	-0.097	-0.027	0.088	-0.008	0.012	-0.104**
	[0.120]	[0.020]	[0.106]	[0.015]	[0.115]	[0.042]
# of children older than 2 (/10)	0.048	-0.062**	0.146	-0.037*	0.138	-0.005
	[0.135]	[0.024]	[0.108]	[0.019]	[0.121]	[0.030]
rural	-0.029	0.005	-0.008	0.011	-0.042	-0.007
	[0.142]	[0.025]	[0.133]	[0.021]	[0.146]	[0.060]
inherited irrigated land	0.046***	-0.004	0.045***	-0.002	0.046***	0.004
	[0.016]	[0.003]	[0.015]	[0.002]	[0.016]	[0.007]
inherited dwelling	-0.022*	-0.001	-0.012	-0.001	-0.005	-0.011
	[0.013]	[0.002]	[0.012]	[0.002]	[0.013]	[0.007]
district dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year of birth dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	19,087	19,087	19,088	19,088	19,087	19,087
First-stage F stat	11.39	11.39	11.39	11.39	11.39	11.39
R-squared	0.138	0.114	0.210	0.077	0.162	0.289

Note. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the district level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimation sample includes women whose year of birth is 1976≤t≤1992. "*years of education*" is the number of years of completed education. "*school age*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman was aged 6-15 while the *Taliban* were in power (1996-2001), 0 otherwise. "*violence insurgents 2004-2007*" is the sum of district-level violent events in the period 2004-2007. "*married*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is married, 0 otherwise. "*# of children younger than 2*" is the number of children who are younger than 2 years. "*# of children older than 2*" is the number of children who are older than 2 years. "*rural*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resides in a rural area, 0 otherwise. "*inherited irrigated* land" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited irrigated land by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*inherited dwelling*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case of ownership of inherited dwelling by any of the household members, 0 otherwise. "*labor force participation*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 in case the woman participates to the labor force, 0 otherwise. "*wage work*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a wage work, 0 otherwise. "*unpaid family worker*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman is an unpaid family worker, 0 otherwise. "*employment external to the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an employment outside the household, 0 otherwise. "*agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has an agricultural job within the household, 0 otherwise. "*non-agricultural employment within the household*" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman has a non-agricultural job within the household, 0 otherwise. The endogenous regressor is "*years of education*" and the instrumental variable is "*school age x district Taliban*", *i.e.* a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the woman was exposed to the *Taliban* rule during school age, 0 otherwise. The two variables that are interacted to build the instrumental variable are: "*school age*", which is defined above in this table note; and "*district Taliban*", which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the woman resided in a district occupied by the *Taliban*, 0 otherwise. Sampling weights are used in all regressions.