

Older Sisters and Younger Brothers:

The Impact of Siblings on Preference for Competition

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Abstract

Psychology studies have long argued the possibility that sibling structure, such as birth order and the sex of siblings, shapes one's personality traits. One of the core issues involved is that of who rates subjects' personality traits in studies. The present studies ($N = 135$ in Study 1, $N = 232$ in Study 2) surpassed the examinations performed in previous studies by obtaining information regarding one of the key personality traits, preference for competition, using a framework developed via experimental economics rather than subjective ratings. Despite the fact that the two studies involved different types of task, we consistently observed that older sisters exerted a significant impact on their younger siblings in both studies. In particular, having an older sister was negatively associated with men's competitive preferences. We also obtained suggestive evidence that having an older sister was positively associated with women's competitive preferences. Our results support sibling hypotheses from the perspective of experimental economics.

Keywords: Sibling competition, Gender, Competition, Personality, Experimental economics

Word count: 6,897, figures: 6, appendix tables in supplementary material: 3

24 **1. Introduction**

25 According to some psychologists, sibling structure is an important environmental
26 contributory factor in personality. Specifically, sibling structure engenders a systematic trend
27 in the personality traits of those whose siblings follow specific gender patterns. One example
28 is the role-assimilation theory formally analyzed by Brim (1958). Based on a series of
29 observational studies by Koch (1954; 1955a; 1955b; 1956a; 1956b; 1956c; 1956d) on primary
30 school students and their siblings, Brim (1958) reported a tendency for mixed-sex sibling pairs
31 to assimilate traits more typically associated with the opposite gender. For instance, older girls
32 with younger brothers displayed more masculine traits (i.e., competitiveness and self-
33 confidence) relative to their counterparts with younger sisters. Similarly, boys with older sisters
34 exhibited more feminine traits (i.e., kindness and cooperation). Interestingly, this effect was
35 stronger for older sister/younger brother pairs relative to older brother/younger sister pairs.
36 While the role assimilation effect between cross-gender sibling pairs could not explain this
37 particular trend exclusively, similar phenomena specific to the relationships between older
38 sisters and younger brothers have been raised in other psychological studies analyzing home-
39 based activities in school-age children (Stewart, 1983; Stoneman, Brody, & MacKinnon, 1986).
40 These studies typically showed that pairs containing older sisters exhibited the greatest role
41 asymmetry, as older sisters often played the roles of managers or meddlesome caretakers.

42 Sulloway (1996) provides a possible explanation for this trend by suggesting that the
43 effects unique to older sister/younger brother relationships arise due to a combination of birth
44 order and role taking. Sulloway's (1996) rationale for the effect of birth order on personality
45 traits is based on the notion of sibling competition in evolutionary science. Based on Darwin's
46 principle of divergence, Sulloway (1996) argues that the strategies siblings use to attract
47 parental investment depend on birth order, which ultimately shapes their personality traits.
48 Specifically, firstborn children tend to be more dominant, aggressive, ambitious, and

49 conservative relative to later-born children. This is intended to meet their parents' expectations
50 and standards, thereby defending their stakes against younger rivals with regard to the
51 allocation of parental resources. Therefore, firstborn children, regardless of whether they are
52 male or female, emerge as "alpha males" in their sibling systems (Sulloway, 1996). This could
53 explain why Brim (1958) observed a stronger "role-taking effect" in older sister/younger
54 brother pairs relative to older brother/younger sister pairs, as the effect of role taking is more
55 gender incongruent when the firstborn is female and the laterborn is male.¹

56 However, it is important to note that some psychologists disagree with the view that
57 sibling dynamics, particularly birth order, systematically influence personality traits. In fact,
58 this issue is the subject of one of the longest debates in psychology. Although the effects of
59 birth order on personality were first observed by Adler (1928) and have since been tested in
60 thousands of studies, Ernst and Angst's (1983) review of the literature concluded that there
61 were only negligible birth order effects across personality variables.

62 One of the ongoing issues involved is that of who rates subjects' personality traits in
63 studies. The literature has indeed reported mixed evidence, implying the sensitivity of the
64 results in using personality inventory scores to detect birth order effects. At most, Jefferson,
65 Herbst, and McCrae (1998) found a negligible effect of birth order on self-rated personality
66 traits in a large representative sample; however, they also reported that, in peer-rated traits,
67 laterborns scored higher in Openness and Agreeableness. Although Marini and Kurtz (2011)
68 found no significant effects of birth order on peer, parent, or self-rated Neuroticism-

¹ Sulloway's (1996) notion of the effect of birth order on one's personality has inspired many empirical studies. Catherine Salmon and her coauthors further elaborated on the idea and showed that middleborns fare even less well than lastborns and are therefore less closely connected to family members, as parental investment of resources disproportionately favors lastborns, who do not need to compete against younger siblings for parental resources (e.g., Salmon, 1999; Salmon, 2003; Salmon & Daly, 1998; Salmon, Shackelford, & Michalski, 2012). Birth order studies have also varied in their approaches, such as those involving the analysis of the effects of birth order on risk taking behavior in baseball and those involving the examination of these effects on income redistribution preferences (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010; Yamamura, 2014).

69 Extraversion-Openness Five-Factor Inventory scores, Saroglou and Fiasse (2003) found that
70 middleborns were less religious and conscientious in both self and mother ratings. A prevailing
71 explanation for the discrepant findings is that these studies failed to account for differences in
72 socioeconomic backgrounds across families. In fact, some reported observations consistent
73 with Sulloway (1996) when family backgrounds were controlled for in a within-family design
74 (Healey & Ellis, 2007; Paulhus, Trapnell, & Chen, 1999). However, even if one could control
75 for family-specific characteristics, evaluators' prior knowledge regarding birth order could also
76 contaminate results. As Ernst and Angst (1983) suggested, parents, influenced by popular birth
77 order views, could rate their children accordingly. This problem cannot necessarily be
78 addressed by asking about birth order once respondents have rated their siblings' personalities,
79 which was the approach used in some within-family studies (Beck, Burnet, & Vosper, 2006;
80 Paulhus et al., 1999). Being asked to rate one's own and a sibling's personalities may evoke
81 "the indirect suggestion that birth order differences are expected" (Marini & Kurtz, 2011, p.
82 913).

83 This study surpassed previous psychological studies by obtaining information
84 regarding one of the key personality traits, preference for competition, using a framework
85 developed via experimental economics rather than subjective ratings.² In our experiment,
86 Japanese high school students were asked to solve as many mazes as possible in several tasks
87 that used different payment schemes (Study 1, $N = 135$). In order to examine whether
88 individuals would opt for a competitive environment, prior to their solving the mazes, the

² We consider that preference for competition is a key personality because it is tightly linked to a basic achievement motive (Spence & Helmreich, 1983). In fact, psychology literature has attempted to measure competitive traits for more than a century, proposing several inventory scores and examining their relationships with a major personality inventory (Fletcher & Nusbaum, 2008; Houston, McIntire, Kinnie, & Terry, 2002; Schmit, Kihm, & Robie, 2000). Recently, economics literature has also reported the importance of competitive traits, by showing that the gender gap in preference for competition constitutes a non-negligible reason why women are generally underrepresented on the career ladder (Booth, Cardona-Sosa, & Nolen, 2014; Buser, Niederle, & Oosterbeek, 2014; Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Tamiya, Lee, & Ohtake, 2012; Wozniak, Harbaugh, & Mayr, 2014)

89 experimenter asked them to indicate whether they preferred to be compensated via piece-rate
90 payment or a tournament payment scheme. As reward via the tournament scheme depended on
91 the performances of the other members in a randomly assigned group, the choice to enter the
92 tournament scheme represented a voluntary choice of competitive environment. We then
93 determined which factors, including sibling structure, accounted for tournament scheme choice
94 and tested whether the long-debated sibling hypotheses in psychology could be supported from
95 an experimental economic perspective. These hypotheses were also tested on a dataset taken
96 from another experiment, in which university students engaged in math-solving tasks with a
97 very similar incentive scheme (Study 2, $N = 232$).

98 Of course, the mere choice of the tournament payment scheme does not immediately
99 indicate that a subject has a higher preference for competition. Voluntary choice of tournament
100 payment could arise as a result of many other factors. Subjects may opt for a competitive
101 environment because they know that they possess superior ability or enjoy taking risks. This
102 complicated our analysis, as all other factors could also be driven by birth order or the sex of
103 siblings. According to the literature in both psychology and economics, older siblings have an
104 influential effect on the development of younger siblings' cognitive abilities (Azmitia & Hesser,
105 1993; Maynard, 2002), and this effect is known to be heterogeneous across sexes in older
106 siblings (Dai & Heckman, 2013). Similarly, risk-taking behavior could also be affected by
107 sibling constellation. Consistent with the view that siblings use various strategies to attract
108 parental investment (Sulloway, 1996), they reported that later-born siblings were more likely
109 to take part in high-risk activities (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010; Longstreth, Longstreth,
110 Ramirez, & Fernandez, 1975; Perkin, 2003). Considering that tournament choice involves the
111 risk that subjects could lose their rewards, there was a possibility that tournament choice in our
112 experiment would represent the extent of subjects' risk tolerance rather than their preference
113 for competition.

114 Overcoming this point was one of important contributions made by the present study. By
115 adapting the experimental framework proposed by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we
116 distinguished preference for competition from other possible confounding factors. In the
117 following analysis, we examined whether sibling constellation contributed to the construction
118 of competitive preference, even after controlling for its effects on other factors such as ability
119 or extent of risk aversion.

120

121 **2. Study 1: Maze-solving task**

122 **2.1. Method**

123 **2.1.1 Subjectss**

124 One hundred thirty-five students from four high schools in the Kyoto area of Japan
125 participated in the study (male = 41, female = 94). The mean ages for male and female subjects
126 were 16.9 years (age range: 15–21 years) and 16.8 years (age range: 15–18 years), respectively.
127 Subjects attended one of four sessions, which took place on July 16 and 22 and October 1, 2011.
128 Five confederates took part in the experiment to make up for last-minute subject withdrawal,
129 as the experiment required groups of four subjects. Data from the confederates were excluded
130 from the analysis. Each subject was assigned to a group, completed tasks that involved solving
131 as many mazes as possible, and was awarded points via one of two payment schemes. Subjects
132 sat in individual booths and were unaware of where the other members of their group were
133 sitting or how the others had performed until the experiment concluded. It should be noted that
134 the subjects in this study had fewer siblings (mean = 1.00) relative to the average number (1.46)
135 reported in the Japanese Survey on Household Trends conducted by the Ministry of Health,
136 Labour and Welfare. Therefore, there was less variation in sibling composition in the present
137 sample relative to that of a larger representative sample of Japanese teenagers.

138

139 **2.1.2. Experimental design and procedure**

140 The experimental design mainly followed the framework used by Niederle and
141 Vesterlund (2007). The experiment consisted of a practice session followed by six tasks. In the
142 practice session, subjects solved mazes on a computer screen for one minute to learn the
143 solutions to the mazes. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the computer display. Subjects were
144 then required to move cursors from the starting position to the goal point using the arrow keys
145 on their keyboards. They could skip as many mazes as they wished by clicking a skip button
146 on the screen to move to the next maze. They received no points for their performance in the
147 practice session. Upon completion of the practice session, subjects progressed to the tasks, in
148 which they were required to solve as many mazes as possible within three minutes and were
149 awarded points under different payment schemes. In Task 1, subjects received points via piece
150 rate: they received 25 points for every correctly solved maze. Task 2 involved a tournament
151 payment scheme: the subject who correctly solved the largest number of mazes in each group
152 received 100 points for every correctly solved maze, while the other three members received
153 no points. As the points awarded in the tournament scheme depended on the performance of
154 the other three members of the group, subjects were exposed to a competitive environment.
155 These two payment schemes were repeated in Tasks 3 and 4, as improvement in performance
156 between the two payment schemes could have reflected learning effects rather than actual
157 responses to competition. In Task 5, prior to solving the mazes, subjects were asked to choose
158 whether they wanted to be paid under a piece-rate or tournament scheme. The choice in Task 5
159 was then used to measure each subject's propensity to opt for competitive environment.

160 Importantly, the mere choice of the tournament scheme in Task 5 did not immediately
161 indicate that the subject preferred competition. The choice in Task 5 could also have reflected
162 factors that were not directly related to preference for competition. For example, some subjects
163 may have chosen the tournament scheme because they overestimated their abilities relative to

164 those of the other group members (overconfidence). Others may have chosen the piece-rate
165 scheme because they were risk averse (risk aversion) or disliked receiving feedback regarding
166 the quality of their performance relative to that of others (feedback aversion). It is also possible
167 that some subjects chose the tournament scheme because they knew that their maze-solving
168 abilities were sufficient (performance level).

169 These traits complicated our analysis, as they could also have been driven by birth order
170 or the sex of subjects' siblings. Indeed, older siblings are known to influence the development
171 of younger siblings' cognitive abilities (Azmitia & Hesser, 1993; Maynard, 2002), and more
172 importantly, this influence is known to be heterogeneous across sexes in older siblings (Dai &
173 Heckman, 2013). Sibling composition could have been an important factor; for instance,
174 parents may have encouraged girls with older sisters to play with their sisters in the same
175 environment, leading to the development of more advanced cognitive abilities. Such
176 environments could also have led the subjects to believe that their skills in these types of task
177 were superior to those of their competitors, generating variance in overconfidence according
178 to sibling composition.³ In a similar vein, birth order is also known to affect risk-taking
179 behavior. Consistent with the view that laterborns use rather adventurous strategies to attain
180 parental resources, studies have reported that younger siblings were more likely to engage in
181 high-risk activities in sports (Sulloway & Zweigenhaft, 2010; Longstreth et al., 1975; Perkin,
182 2003). Therefore, birth order and the sex of siblings could affect other traits in different ways,
183 making it difficult to interpret the birth order effect by merely considering tournament scheme
184 choice in Task 5.

185 The goal of implementing Task 6 was to determine whether the subjects' decisions to
186 compete in Task 5 could be explained solely by a higher preference for competition. In Task 6,
187 subjects were asked to choose the payment scheme via which they would receive points *for*

³ We thank the reviewer for providing us with this example.

188 *their performance in Task 3*, the second piece-rate task. If subjects chose the piece-rate scheme,
189 they received 25 points for every correctly solved maze in Task 3; if they chose the tournament
190 scheme, they received 100 points for every correctly solved maze in Task 3 if they were the
191 best performer and no points if they were not. As point allocation was based on past
192 performance, subjects did not solve any mazes in Task 6 but speculated on their relative
193 performance within the group. Therefore, subjects' choices in Task 6 were influenced by some
194 factors, such as overconfidence, risk-aversion, feedback aversion, and performance level, but
195 were not affected by preference for competition (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Conversely,
196 choices in Task 5 involved actual competition and subjects' speculation on their relative
197 performance. Therefore, the decision to compete in Task 5 could be seen as reflective of
198 individual tastes regarding participation in competitions, in addition to overconfidence and risk
199 and feedback aversion. By examining the differences in payment scheme choices between
200 Tasks 5 and 6, individual preferences for competition would be revealed (Niederle and
201 Vesterlund, 2007).

202 In particular, we tested our hypothesis formally by estimating a binary response model
203 of payment scheme choice in Task 5 after controlling for tournament scheme choice in Task 6
204 and other relevant traits. In essence, the model estimates for a sibling constellation variable tell
205 us how the individual's probability will increase/decrease if he or she follows a certain sibling
206 structure (e.g., has older brothers), conditional on inherent maze-solving ability and the extent
207 of the individual's overconfidence and risk and feedback aversion. We could purge these
208 covariates because we have information concerning subjects' ability in Tasks 1–4 and their
209 decisions regarding whether to enter the tournament payment scheme in Task 6. As Task 6 did
210 not involve the maze-solving task, but subjects were still required to speculate on how many
211 mazes the other group members had solved, controlling for tournament choice in Task 6
212 removes all factors other than preference for competition (e.g., overconfidence and risk

213 aversion). The supplementary appendices provide further details regarding the estimation
214 procedure.

215 Subsequent to completing Tasks 1–5, each subject was asked to estimate his or her rank
216 within the group. The estimated ranks were then used to infer the extent of subjects’
217 overconfidence for analysis. Unlike the study conducted by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007),
218 subjects were not paid for each correct guess regarding rank.⁴

219 To evaluate subjects’ attitudes toward competition accurately, students were
220 incentivized in the following way. Upon conclusion of the experiment, subjects entered a
221 lottery and randomly selected one task of the six for which rewards were offered. Students were
222 paid according to the points awarded for the selected task, plus 500 points as a participation
223 fee. Subjects were awarded prizes rather than cash for their points, as cash transactions were
224 prohibited by the high schools involved in the study. The prizes consisted of various stationery
225 items, and subjects received different combinations of these items according to performance.⁵
226 Special care was taken not to mention the specific prizes that subjects would receive until the
227 experiment concluded, as the subjective value of the prizes could vary between subjects;
228 therefore, they were simply instructed to earn as many points as possible.

229 Upon conclusion of the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire
230 containing items concerning demographic information including sibling composition. This
231 information was used to examine the extent to which sibling structure systematically affected
232 a subject’s choice of the tournament scheme in Tasks 5 and 6, thereby revealing their preference

⁴ By paying for each correct guess in the early version of our experiment, we unexpectedly faced a situation in which some subjects chose a strategy in which they solved none of the mazes in tasks with the tournament payment scheme and “guessed” that they ranked the lowest in a group. This strategy maximized total payment when their expected probability of winning the tournament was initially low.

⁵ Prizes were selected with the permission of the high schools involved in the study. Prizes included three colored clips (25 points), a clear folder (50 points), a memo-pad (100 points), five colored pens (500 points), a mechanical pencil and a plastic school bag (1,000 points), and a fabric school bag (1,500 points). Upon conclusion of the experiment, students received a combination of these prizes. Rewards: 100 points was roughly equivalent to 100 JPY, which was equivalent to approximately 1 USD at the time of writing.

233 for competition.

234

235 **2.2. Results**

236 Figure 2 presents the proportion of subjects who chose to compete in the tournament
237 payment scheme in Task 5 according to sex and sibling composition. Subjects could belong to
238 more than two of the categories shown in Figure 2, if they had more than two siblings (e.g., if
239 both “has younger sisters” and “has older sisters” applied). The graph was consistent with the
240 sibling hypotheses suggested by Brim (1958) and Sulloway (1996). Despite the fact that more
241 men than women generally entered the tournament scheme (mean tournament entry rates: 61%
242 and 23.4% respectively), the gender gap was remarkably reduced when certain groups of
243 subjects were compared. For example, 39% of women with a younger brother entered the
244 tournament in Task 5, while only 38% of men with an older sister entered the tournament.
245 However, the variation in preference for competition by sibling composition is not immediately
246 apparent in Figure 2. As mentioned in Section 2.1.2, the raw differences in tournament scheme
247 choice could have indicated variation in confounding factors such as overconfidence, risk
248 aversion, feedback aversion, and performance level. To determine whether sibling structure
249 affected individual preference for competition, we needed to purge these confounding factors
250 from the raw differences in choice of the tournament scheme shown in Figure 2.

251 For this reason, we tested our hypothesis formally by estimating a binary response model
252 of payment scheme choice in Task 5. Figure 3 shows the estimated marginal effects for sibling
253 constellation variables from probit model estimations, in which effects were estimated as the
254 difference from the effect on the rest of male or female observations.⁶ The positive value
255 indicates that the individual has higher preference for competition than the rest of the
256 men/women do, while the negative value indicates the opposite. As the vertical axis measures

⁶ The detailed estimation results for Figure 3 are presented in Table B1 in the supplementary appendices.

257 the difference between the subject and the rest of either the men or the women, the bars are not
258 directly comparable between sibling constellation groups. The estimated effects roughly
259 supported the sibling hypothesis. For example, having older sisters reduced men's propensity
260 to select the tournament scheme by 27% relative to other men, with all other covariates being
261 fixed ($p = 0.028$). The magnitude of this decrease was almost comparable in size to the
262 estimated negative effect of being female on choice of the tournament scheme (-41%).⁷
263 Therefore, men with older sisters showed lower preference for competition. In contrast, having
264 younger brothers increased women's propensity to compete, although this did not differ
265 significantly from zero ($p = 0.11$).

266

267 **3. Study 2: Math-solving task**

268 **3.1 Method**

269 The purpose of conducting a second study was to complement the small sample size in
270 Study 1. Our second study used a larger experimental dataset ($N = 232$), which was originally
271 obtained for the Institute of Social and Economic Research collaboration project conducted at
272 Osaka University.⁸ In the

273 experiment, subjects were asked to solve a sequence of counting problems in a very
274 similar framework to that used in Study 1. We examined whether a similar pattern would be
275 observed in a larger sample of subjects engaged in a math-solving task.

276

277 **3.1.1. Subjects**

278 Two hundred thirty-two students from Osaka University participated in the study (men

⁷ The estimate for being female is presented in the first row of Model 6 in Table B1 (supplementary material).

⁸ Part of this project was published in another study (Mizutani, Okudaira, Kinari, & Ohtake, 2009), in which the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) gender-gap hypothesis was tested with Japanese university students.

279 = 114, women = 118). The mean ages for men and women were 20.1 years (age range: 18–29
280 years) and 20.3 years (age range: 18–25 years), respectively. Subjects attended one of twelve
281 sessions, which took place between 2007 and 2008 (November 12, 14, and 15 in 2007 and
282 December 16, 18, and 19 in 2008). As in Study 1, each subject was assigned a group of four
283 subjects and was unaware of where the other members of his or her group were sitting. Four
284 confederates took part in the experiment to make up for last-minute subject withdrawal, and
285 their responses were excluded from the analysis. Similar to Study 1, variation in sibling
286 composition was lower in the present study sample relative to that of a larger representative
287 sample of young Japanese adults (mean = 1.19).

288

289 **3.1.2. Experimental design and procedure**

290 The experiment was conducted in exactly the same manner as that of Study 1, with the
291 exception of the following changes. First, in Study 2, subjects engaged in a math-solving, rather
292 than maze-solving, task. Figure 4 shows a screenshot of the computer display.⁹ In each task,
293 subjects were asked to calculate the sums of 5 two-digit numbers within five minutes. They
294 were not permitted to use a calculator; rather, they were provided with a pencil and pieces of
295 scrap paper and asked to solve as many problems as possible within five minutes.

296 Second, in Study 2, subjects received cash rather than prizes, based on their
297 performance in a randomly selected task. In the piece-rate payment scheme, subjects received
298 100 JPY (approximately 1 USD on July 16, 2014) for every correctly solved problem. In the
299 tournament payment scheme, they received 400 JPY for every correctly solved problem if they
300 solved the largest number of problems correctly within the group; otherwise, they received 0
301 JPY. All subjects received 2,000 JPY as a participation fee.

302 Finally, in Study 2, the piece-rate and tournament payment schemes were not repeated

⁹ This type of experiment can also be programmed by the free software, Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).

303 (as in Tasks 3 and 4 in Study 1). In particular, upon completion of the practice session, the
304 subjects engaged in math-solving tasks and were awarded points via the piece-rate (Task I) and
305 then under a tournament payment scheme (Task II); thereafter, prior to solving further math
306 problems, they were asked to choose the payment scheme via which they would receive points
307 for the task (Task III, corresponding to Task 5 in Study 1). In the final task (Task IV,
308 corresponding to Task 6 in Study 1), subjects were asked to choose the payment scheme via
309 which they would receive points for their performance in Task I, originally the piece-rate task.
310 They did not actually solve any problems in the final task, as in Study 1.

311

312 **3.2. Results**

313 Figure 5 shows the proportion of subjects who chose to enter the tournament payment
314 scheme in Task III according to sex and sibling constellation. Subjects could belong to more
315 than two of the categories shown in Figure 5, if they had more than two siblings (e.g., if both
316 ‘has younger sisters’ and ‘has older sisters’ applied). Compared to Study 1, the overall rates of
317 tournament scheme entry were lower for both men and women, respectively, in Study 2. The
318 mean tournament scheme entry rates were 61% for men and 23.4% for women in Study 1 and
319 42.6% for men and 18.2% for women in Study 2 (see Table A1 in supplementary appendices
320 for summary statistics). However, when we considered tournament scheme entry according to
321 sibling constellation, a consistent pattern was observed. Similar to Study 1, only 24% of males
322 with an older sister chose the tournament, while 48% of the rest of the men did. Interestingly,
323 women with older sisters showed relatively high rates of competitive choice. The tournament
324 scheme entry rate was 30% for women with older sisters, which was significantly higher than
325 that of other women (two-tailed t test: $p = 0.065$, Cohen’s $d = 0.35$). In contrast, fewer women
326 with a younger brother entered the tournament scheme in Study 2 relative to those in Study 1.
327 Only 13.3% chose to compete, which is rather low relative to the average tournament scheme

328 entry rate for women (18.2%).

329 Figure 6 confirms that the insights shown in Figure 5 were maintained, even after
330 controlling for several confounding factors.¹⁰ Similar to the results of Study 1, having an older
331 sister exerted a significant effect on competitive preference in younger siblings. When the
332 covariates were controlled for, men with an older sister were 21% less likely to enter the
333 tournament scheme relative to the remainder of the men ($p = 0.02$). Interestingly, women with
334 an older sister were 29% more likely to enter the tournament scheme relative to the remainder
335 of the women ($p = 0.02$). The latter effect was close in size to the estimated negative effect of
336 being a woman on tournament scheme entry (-36%).¹¹ Therefore, roughly speaking, women
337 with an older sister behaved more like average men, rather than average women, in terms of
338 competition preference. However, unlike the findings of Study 1, having a younger brother
339 exerted a negative effect on women's competition decisions, although this was nonsignificant
340 ($p = 0.26$).

341

342 **4. Discussion**

343 This study explored the effect of sibling constellation on an important personality trait,
344 preference for competition, from the perspective of experimental economics. We analyzed a
345 dataset obtained via simple laboratory experiments, similar to that designed by Niederle and
346 Vesterlund (2007), on Japanese high school and university students, who were incentivized
347 with pecuniary rewards.

348 Although this was not the first study to examine birth order effects via economics
349 experiment (Courtiol, Raymond, & Faurie, 2009), no previous psychology studies have
350 determined preference for competition via actual behavioral responses in an incentivized

¹⁰ The detailed estimation results for Figure 6 are presented in Table B2 in the supplementary appendices.

¹¹ The estimate for being a woman is presented in the first row of Model 6 in Table B2 (supplementary material).

351 environment or purged the confounding factors that could correlate with the personality trait
352 itself.¹² For instance, the decision to enter a competitive environment is influenced by many
353 factors other than competitive preference, such as original performance level or risk-taking
354 preference. By taking advantage of the experimental design originally proposed by Niederle
355 and Vesterlund (2007), our studies controlled for these covariates and determined whether the
356 competitive trait could be enhanced by a particular sibling structure.

357 Despite the fact that subjects engaged in completely different tasks in the two
358 experiments, we observed some consistent patterns. First, the experiments showed that men
359 were significantly more likely to choose to compete relative to women. This is consistent with
360 the findings of Neiderle and Vesterlund (2007) and classifications established by Brim (1958),
361 in which competitiveness was treated as a masculine trait. Second, we found that older sisters
362 significantly influenced their younger rivals in both studies. In particular, having an older sister
363 was *negatively* associated with men's competitive preference in both studies (Figures 3 and 6).
364 This systematic pattern arose as a result of preference for competition rather than confounding
365 factors such as performance level or risk preference. Interestingly, having an older sister was
366 *positively* associated with women's competitive preference, although this relationship was
367 significant only in Study 2. Finally, the effects of the sex of younger siblings were sensitive
368 across studies. We did not find consistent evidence to suggest that women with younger
369 brothers were more competitive.

370 One interesting finding was that having an older sister exerted a negative effect on
371 preference for competition in men, but the effect was not observed in those men with an older
372 brother or a younger sister. This is consistent with both Brim's (1958) role assimilation theory

¹² Courtiol et al. (2009) examined the relationship between birth order and trust/reciprocity in an economics experiment. Although they found that firstborns were less trustful relative to laterborns and only children, the amount of money the first player sends to the second player, which they used as a measure of trustworthiness, also reflects the extent to which the first player tolerates the risk that the second player would send nothing back.

373 and Sulloway's (1996) birth order theory. Specifically, birth order theory alone cannot explain
374 our results, as men with an older brother would be expected to possess the laterborn tendencies
375 found in those with an older sister, which was not observed in our studies. Similarly, Brim
376 (1958)'s role assimilation theory alone cannot explain our results, as men with a younger sister
377 would be expected to possess the feminine, less competitive, traits found in those with an older
378 sister, which was not observed in our studies. Therefore, a combination of the two theories
379 reflected the asymmetric effect of older sisters on younger brother's weak preference for
380 competition.

381 Another suggestive but interesting finding in our studies was that having a same-sex
382 older sibling increased preference for competition, although this was only statistically
383 significant in one sibling constellation (i.e., women with older sisters in Study 2). Same-sex
384 siblings share similar interests and family resource concerns; therefore, they are more likely to
385 encounter conflict. In fact, Daly, Wilson, Salmon, Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, and Hasegawa (2001)
386 examined official statistics regarding siblicide in several countries and found that it is observed
387 far more frequently in same-sex siblings.

388 While same-sex sibling competition may explain our result in part, it should also be
389 noted that this is incongruent with a prediction of Brim's (1958) role-assimilation theory as
390 applied to women. Brim (1958) observed that girls in same-sex female dyads showed stronger
391 sex-typed traits and were less competitive relative to girls in male-female dyads. One reason
392 for this discrepancy could be that our sample consisted of Japanese high school and college
393 students of the 2000s, whereas Brim's (1958) sample consisted of five- and six-year-olds in
394 mid-twentieth-century Chicago. Cultural and social backgrounds and expected gender roles
395 could differ too much between the two samples to allow for detection of persistent behavioral
396 patterns.

397 Finally, our experiment was subject to methodological limitations that should be

398 addressed in future research. First, we did not collect information regarding the age gaps
399 between subjects and their siblings, despite the fact that the literature suggests that the birth
400 order effect is best detected in siblings who are three to five years apart in age (Sulloway, 1996).
401 Second, it should be noted that both study samples were not cleanly representative of young
402 Japanese people, as our subjects had fewer siblings than average and were therefore more likely
403 to be singleton sons or daughters relative to average students in the population. The academic
404 achievements of the subjects in Study 2 were disproportionately high, as the entrance
405 examination for Osaka University is one of the most selective of all Japanese universities. For
406 this reason, we may have inadvertently selected students who preferred competition. If the
407 competitive students were spread unevenly across sibling constellations, our estimates could
408 have been biased. Last, and most importantly, some of our tests were underpowered due to the
409 small sample size. Therefore, we might have failed to reject the null too often when the
410 alternative was true (i.e., large type II error). We should add the caveat that the insignificant
411 estimates observed for some sibling constellations might have been the product of a relatively
412 underpowered test that bears replication with larger samples.

413

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422

423 **Conflicts of interest**

424 The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

425

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


Figure 1. Overview of Basic Screen (Study 1)




Figure 2. Proportion of participants who chose to compete in Task 5 (Study 1)

Note. Capped spikes represent standard errors. d indicate an absolute value of Cohen's d , where the effect size is estimated in a mean difference test between the sibling constellation and the rest of men/women. In panel (A), a mean difference between men who have older sisters (mean = 0.38, $N = 8$) and the rest of men (mean = 0.67, $N = 33$) is 0.29 (two-tailed t test: $p = 0.14$, Cohen's $d = 0.49$). In panel (B), a mean difference between women who have younger brothers (mean = 0.39, $N = 18$) and the rest of women (mean = 0.20, $N = 76$) is 0.19 (two-tailed t test: $p = 0.086$, Cohen's $d = -0.36$).




Figure 3. Preference for Competition (Study 1)

Note. The bars indicate the estimated marginal effects on the probability to enter the tournament in comparison to the rest of male/female observations. Positive values indicate that a subject has the higher preference for competition than the rest of male/female observations do, while negative values indicate the opposite. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Capped spikes represent standard errors. Each estimate is from Models 3 to 7 in Table B1, and only the estimates for sibling constellation variables are shown in the figure. Since the vertical axis measures the difference from the rest of men or women, bars are not directly comparable across sibling constellation groups.

The payment scheme for the on-going task.

The time elapsed

Number of the current task.

The screenshot shows a task interface with a green header bar. The left side contains a sidebar with several sections: an orange header '歩合制', a light green section '前問の正否', a yellow section '実行中タスク正答数 <0/0>', and three white sections for 'タスク(1)の正解数', 'タスク(2)の正解数', and 'タスク(3)の正解数', each containing a slash. The main area has a green bar at the top with 'タスク(1)実行中' and a timer '0:04'. Below this is a grid of five numbers: 82, 29, 47, 11, 80. Underneath the grid is an input field labeled '回答入力' and a '次へ' button.

Numbers of correctly solved problems for the completed tasks.

Type in the answer and press "next (次へ)"

Figure 4. Overview of Basic Screen (Study 2)




Figure 5. Proportion of participants who chose to compete in Task III (Study 2)

Note. Capped spikes represent standard errors. d indicate an absolute value of Cohen's d , where the effect size is estimated in a mean difference test between the sibling constellation and the rest of men/women. In panel (A), a mean difference between men who have older sisters (mean = 0.24, $N = 25$) and the rest of men (mean = 0.48, $N = 89$) is 0.24 (two-tailed t test: $p = 0.03$, Cohen's $d = 0.42$). In panel (B), a mean difference between women who have older sisters (mean = 0.30, $N = 30$) and the rest of women (mean = 0.15, $N = 88$) is -0.15 (two-tailed t test: $p = 0.07$, Cohen's $d = -0.35$).




Figure 6. Preference for Competition (Study 2)

Note. The bars indicate the estimated marginal effects on the probability to enter the tournament in comparison to the rest of male/female observations. Positive values indicate that a subject has the higher preference for competition than the rest of male/female observations do, while negative values indicate the opposite. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Capped spikes represent standard errors. Each estimate is from Models 3 to 7 in Table B2, and only the estimates for sibling constellation variables are shown in the figure. Since the vertical axis measures the difference from the rest of men or women, bars are not directly comparable across sibling constellation groups.