# The Decline in Lifetime Earnings Mobility in the U.S.: Evidence from Survey-Linked Administrative Data 

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April 25, 2016


#### Abstract

There is a sizable literature that examines whether intergenerational mobility has declined as inequality has increased. This literature is motivated by a desire to understand whether increasing inequality has made it more difficult to rise from humble origins. An equally important component of economic mobility is the ability to move across the earnings distribution during one's own working years. We use survey-linked administrative data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation to examine trends in lifetime earnings mobility since 1981. These unique data allow us to produce the first estimates of lifetime earnings mobility from administrative earnings across gender and education subgroups. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we find that lifetime earnings mobility has declined since the early 1980s as inequality has increased. Declines in lifetime earnings mobility are largest for college-educated workers though mobility has declined for men and women and across the distribution of educational attainment. One striking feature is the decline in upward mobility among middle-class workers, even those with a college degree. Across the distribution of educational attainment, the likelihood of moving to the top deciles of the earnings distribution for workers who start their career in the middle of the earnings distribution has declined by approximately $20 \%$ since the early 1980s.


Overall income and earnings inequality has risen dramatically since the 1970s, as has withingroup residual wage inequality. ${ }^{1}$ One of the major concerns surrounding rising inequality is its

[^0]implications for economic mobility including intergenerational mobility, short-run earnings fluctuations, and mobility over a working lifetime. Each of these measures of movement across the earnings distribution informs our understanding of the consequences of inequality. Trends in intergenerational mobility help us understand whether equality of opportunity, broadly defined, is increasing or decreasing. Short-run earnings fluctuations, on the other hand, are important if credit constraints are binding and more earnings variability is accompanied by an inability to smooth variable earnings. Lifetime earnings mobility intersects with each of these concepts.

In one sense, movement across the earnings distribution over a working life is simply the accumulation of short-run earnings fluctuations. Over a working life, the ability to smooth variable earnings is a function of whether short-run shocks accumulate and cause earnings to rise more slowly, or not at all. Intragenerational mobility also complements our understanding of equality of opportunity from the intergenerational mobility literature. It allows us to understand the extent to which children experience upward mobility in their parents' earnings as they grow up and also the extent to which the place in the earnings distribution where one starts as a young adult, which is a function of parental earnings, determines where one ends up. While the literature on intergenerational mobility has investigated the relationship between parental income and educational attainment (Chetty et al., 2014), we do not know whether the relative lifetime earnings mobility that one can expect from a college degree has changed over time. More broadly, we do not know whether the returns to schooling have been sufficiently large to offset the increase in distance between ranks in the earnings distribution as inequality has risen, particularly at the top of the earnings distribution.

Although there is concern that rising inequality is associated with decreasing intergenerational mobility (Corak, 2013), since the 1970s, rank-based measures of intergenerational mobility have remained stable in the United States (Chetty et al., 2014) while short-run earnings have become more volatile (Carr and Wiemers, 2016; Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2009; Shin and Solon, 2011). The previous literature on lifetime earnings mobility suggests that mobility increased between
the 1950s and 1970s and has remained constant or increased slightly since the 1970s (Acs and Zimmerman, 2008; Auten and Gee, 2009; Kopczuk, Saez, and Song, 2010). Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) emphasize the importance of gender differences in trends of lifetime earnings mobility because, while trends for women exhibit increasing lifetime earnings mobility, particularly over the period between 1950 and 1970, the trends for men suggest stable or even declining mobility. Given the differential trends in educational attainment by gender (Golden, Katz, and Kuziemko, 2006), this result strongly suggests the need to understand trends in intragenerational mobility by educational attainment.

This paper uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) linked to administrative earnings records to examine lifetime earnings mobility between 1981 and 2008 using a variety of measures of relative mobility and across gender and education subgroups. We are able to estimate mobility measures covering all of the 1980s-essentially starting where Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) end. Because we use administrative data linked to survey data, we are also able to consider trends in lifetime earnings mobility for education subgroups, something that is not possible with administrative data alone. We use several summary measures of mobility along with decile transition matrices.

Quite in contrast with the existing literature, our results show that increases in inequality since the 1980s have been coupled with declines in lifetime earnings mobility. Summary measures show that mobility has declined for men and women and for college-educated workers. Transition matrices also show declining mobility for workers with less education. Across all subgroups, declines in overall mobility over time are largely the result of a decreasing likelihood of moving from the middle to the top of the earnings distribution over a working lifetime. Declines in middleclass upward mobility are consistent with the polarization in job growth (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008) and with rising inequality at the top of the earnings distribution (Piketty and Saez, 2003) and is particularly problematic in the presence of declining median wages.

## 1 Brief Literature Review

This paper focuses on understanding and describing trends in lifetime earnings mobility as distinct from mobility over shorter horizons of one, two, or five years. Mobility is neither a single concept nor a single measure. ${ }^{2}$ Individuals may experience absolute earnings increases at the same time that their position in the earnings distribution declines; or they may experience highly variable earnings in the short run but little movement in either the level of earnings or their relative position in the long run. We consider measures of positional (or relative) mobility, asking whether the probability of moving rank in the earnings distribution over long time periods has changed over time. The sole focus on rank-based measures of lifetime earnings mobility allows us to consider whether moving up within the earnings distribution over one's life has become more difficult as inequality has increased.

The literature on lifetime earnings mobility examining changes in earnings over ten-year intervals or greater is small, perhaps because the data requirements are so extensive. Measuring lifetime earnings mobility requires panel data with large cross-sectional sample sizes that includes multiple cohorts over a long period of time, with little attrition. The existing work uses either administrative earnings records or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and suggests that overall, mobility has been stable or slightly increasing over time (Acs and Zimmerman, 2008; Auten and Gee, 2009; Auten, Gee, and Turner, 2013; Kopczuk, Saez, and Song, 2010) though Bradbury and Katz (2009) find evidence of declining mobility. Existing work relies mostly on non-parametric measures of earnings mobility such as transition matrices, inequality indices, and rank correlations.

Auten and Gee (2009) and Auten, Gee, and Turner (2013) use a sample of tax filers and find no evidence of a change in relative lifetime mobility in income and rather show that the widening of income gaps from growing income inequality were offset by increased absolute income mobility. In other words, despite the fact that the distance between ranks in the earnings distribu-

[^1]tion has widened, overall earnings growth was fast enough that mobility between ranks remained unchanged. Similarly, Acs and Zimmerman (2008) use the PSID and find that both relative and absolute transition matrices and linear probability models predicting movement into and out of the bottom quintile over a ten-year period suggest no change in long-run family income mobility between the 1984 to 1994 and the 1994 to 2004 periods, though they note the importance of educational attainment in predicting upward mobility. Using very similar data from the PSID and an extensive battery of relative and absolute mobility measures, Bradbury and Katz (2009) find declines in long-run mobility in family income between 1968 and 2005. However, the declines that Bradbury and Katz (2009) find are mostly small and while mobility declines between 1968 and the late-1980s, mobility seems to have increased in recent decades. Despite the difference in interpretation by the authors, the findings of Acs and Zimmerman (2008) and Bradbury and Katz (2009) do not appear to be inconsistent with one another.

Most relevant to our work is Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010), who use Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings records with measures of relative mobility and find rising mobility for women and falling mobility for men over the period between the 1950s and late-1970s. The SIPP data that we use begins in 1978, allowing us to extend their work. As we describe in Section 2.1, the SIPP administrative data are better equipped to address questions regarding population representativeness than either administrative or survey data alone because they are linked to a nationally-representative survey sample, but do not have the attrition or measurement error problems typically associated with survey-based panel data. This latter point is critical for studies of mobility because the probability of attriting is likely correlated with mobility both because lowerincome individuals are more likely to attrit and because attrition is associated with more unstable earnings (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffitt, 1998; Schoeni and Wiemers, 2015). Relative to other administrative data, the SIPP have the advantage of containing information on educational attainment, which our results show is crucial to understanding the contours of declining mobility.

It is worth noting that lifetime earnings mobility combines the effect of long-lived transitory
earnings shocks and movement across the distribution of permanent earnings and thus intersects with the large body of literature on trends in transitory earnings instability and the distribution of permanent earnings (Haider, 2001; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012; Shin and Solon, 2011). The broad consensus in this literature is that there has been both a widening of the permanent component of earnings and an increase in transitory earnings instability since the 1970s (Carr and Wiemers, 2016; Haider, 2001; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012; Shin and Solon, 2011). However, as mentioned above, this literature does not address how these shocks accumulate, and thus does not directly inform earnings changes over longer time horizons.

## 2 Data and Methodology

### 2.1 Data

The data for this project come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation Gold Standard File (SIPP GSF). The SIPP is a nationally representative sample of the civilian noninstitutionalized population of the U.S. that began in 1984. There have been 14 SIPP panels since 1984 with each panel lasting between two and four years. Within panels the SIPP is longitudinal, but each panel draws a new nationally representative sample of 14,000 to 52,000 households. The SIPP GSF links each individual in a SIPP household in the 1984, and 1990 - 2008 SIPP panels to their IRS and SSA earnings and benefits records through 2011.3

Earnings histories in the SIPP GSF come from the Summary Earnings Records (SER) and Detailed Earnings Records (DER), which are co-maintained by the SSA and the IRS. The SER includes FICA taxable earnings, so are capped at the FICA taxable maximum. The DER contains

[^2]the balance of earnings. The sum of the two provides non-topcoded total earnings from 1978 to 2011, which include deferred and non-deferred earnings from all jobs and from self-employment but do not include under the table earnings not reported to the IRS. Prior to 1978, the dataset includes FICA taxable earnings back to 1951. If all earnings values are zero or missing, then the individual had zero earnings for that year.

Missing data can arise either because the SIPP survey participant refused to answer a specific demographic question or because the SIPP respondent could not be matched to administrative earnings or benefits data. The match rate for most panels is quite high. In the 1980's and 1990's panels, the match rate hovers around $80 \%$. In 2001, the match rate dropped to $47 \%$ because many SIPP participants refused to provide social security numbers. Beginning with the 2004 panel, the match rate increased to around $90 \%$ because the Census Bureau changed its matching procedures removing the necessity to explicitly ask for social security numbers. While the public use SIPP has missing observations that are imputed using a hot-deck method, the Gold Standard File uses a substantially more sophisticated multiple imputation method to replace missing observations (see Abowd and Stinson (2013) for details). The Census Bureau advises against excluding imputed observations and we have thus included these observations. It is important to note that the low match rate in 2001 only affects individuals interviewed in the 2001 SIPP panel, it has no implications for the ability to follow individuals interviewed in other panels through the 2000s.

In addition to the administrative earnings records, the SIPP GSF has basic demographic and human capital variables, marriage histories, fertility histories, as well as self-reported earnings and work hours from the SIPP survey. The complete administrative SSA and IRS earnings history is linked to every individual that is ever surveyed in any of the included SIPP panels. For example, if a 55 year old individual is surveyed in the 2004 panel, the SIPP GSF will include that individual's (non-topcoded) earnings from 1978 through 2004 and from 2005 through 2011, and their FICA taxable earnings back to 1951 or the beginning of the individual's work life. This applies both to people of working age in their SIPP panel and to children. Variables collected in the SIPP panels
that are not linked to administrative data cover only the years of the individual's SIPP panel. Each SIPP panel is chosen to be nationally representative of the population at the time of the panel, with the exception of a small oversample of low-income households.

The SIPP GSF has some important advantages for understanding earnings mobility. Ideally, research on mobility would rely on datasets that have both long panels of individuals, large crosssections, and demographic and human capital data. The SIPP GSF is the only dataset on the U.S. that we are aware of that has all three of these characteristics. The long panels provide the ability to describe changes in mobility through time, while the large cross-sections allow measurement of mobility within subgroups. The small number of papers on intragenerational mobility in the U.S. have either used administrative earnings data alone or the PSID. The PSID has the possibility of creating long panels, but once one selects for individuals with non-missing observations on earnings spaced far enough apart to cover an entire work life, the resulting sample typically does not have a large cross-section, and, because of following rules and differential attrition, it may not be population representative. Similar to the administrative data used in Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) and Auten and Gee (2009), the SIPP GSF includes non-topcoded earnings with little measurement error and no attrition bias. However, the SIPP GSF also has data on human capital, demographic, and labor supply characteristics and is representative of all individuals, both workers and non-workers. The inclusion of demographic and human capital characteristics is particularly important, and is arguably the single greatest advantage of this dataset over other administrative datasets. In addition, the fact that the data is nationally representative of both workers and nonworkers creates an advantage over Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010), whose long time series of mobility from the early 1950s necessitated the use of workers in a subset of industries. The disadvantage of the SIPP GSF compared with the SSA data in Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) is that the SIPP GSF does not contain the quarter in which the Social Security earnings cap was reached and so does not allow us to impute non-topcoded earnings prior to 1978. For this reason, we focus on the more recent period for which the data are not topcoded. Overall, the SIPP GSF allows for
panel lengths similar to the those possible with the PSID, but with much larger cross-sections, and no attrition. Compared with the SIPP survey data, the SIPP GSF has the advantage of longer panels of administrative earnings with no attrition.

### 2.2 Sample and Earnings Measures

To best capture an individual's typical earnings early and late in life, we use a seven-year average of annual earnings centered on year $t$. To be included in the sample, an individual must be 25 to 59 years old during the entire seven-year period over which earnings are averaged. To reduce the impact of individuals with very marginal labor force attachment, average earnings over the sevenyear period must be above a minimum threshold of one-fourth of a full-year full-time minimum wage in 2013 (\$3770) indexed to inflation, and individuals must have positive earnings in year $t$. The sample includes data on well over 700,000 individuals, and has yearly cross-sectional samples ranging from 250,000 to 450,000 observations.

### 2.3 Mobility Measures

Lifetime earnings mobility is captured by estimating the relationship between the average earnings centered around year $t$ and average earnings centered around year $t+15$ for individuals with earnings in both $t$ and $t+15$. For example, if $t=1981$ and an individual is 30 years old then we examine the relationship between average earnings for that individual between ages 27-33, and average earnings between ages 42-48. The choice of window length involves a tradeoff. The starting age of the sample cannot begin too early because it would include too many individuals who are still in school. Because of the role of education in starting earnings, these individuals have may artificially low initial earnings and thus inflated lifetime earnings growth. Further, the length of the window itself needs to be long enough to allow for movement across the earnings distribution, but increasing the length of the window means losing estimates of mobility for more
recent years. A 15-year window balances these tensions. The combination of the 15 -year window and limiting the sample to ages 25 to 59 means that initial earnings is estimated for individuals 28 to 44 , while final earnings is for individuals 42 to 56 . The obvious drawback is that mobility between any two pairs of years will include in the starting window some individuals who are early in their working life and some who are at their peak earning age, while the ending window will include some individuals who are in their peak earnings age and some near the end of their working life. To account for any changes in the average age of our sample over time, we use residuals from a regression of seven-year average log earnings on a quadratic in age run separately by calendar year.

Rank-based measures of mobility require individuals to be placed in an earnings distribution. In year $t(t+15)$, individuals are placed in the distribution of age-adjusted seven-year average earnings for everyone in the sample in year $t(t+15)$ - that is, the sample of individuals 25 to 59 with positive earnings in year $t(t+15)$ and with average earnings above the minimum threshold. When we analyze gender and education subgroups, individuals are placed in the overall age-adjusted average earnings distribution, rather than in the distribution for their subgroup. For each measure of mobility, bootstrap estimates of the sampling variability are provided. Resampling techniques allow us to account for the fact that we are simultaneously estimating two earnings distributions and the relationship between ranks, both of which contribute to the variability of a given estimate of mobility.

As a baseline measure of mobility, we use a rank-rank regression summary measure to describe time trends in lifetime earnings mobility between 1978 and 2011. The rank-rank regression concept comes from the literature on intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al., 2014), and is specified as:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{rank}_{i, t+T}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} \operatorname{rank}_{i t}+\epsilon_{i t} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\beta_{1}$ measures positional mobility and $\beta_{0}$ is a measure of absolute mobility in ranks. Individ-
uals are first assigned the appropriate percentile rank. We then estimate equation 1 with OLS for each year for the pooled sample, and for gender and education subgroups. Rank-rank regressions provide a simple descriptive summary of the persistence of position in the earnings distribution aross the entire earnings distribution. This is the first application of rank-rank regressions to longrun mobility though Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish (2011) used a similar method in describing trends in earnings volatility.

Rank-rank regressions rely on the assumption that the correlation between starting rank and average ending rank in the earnings distribution is constant across the distribution of starting earnings. If this is assumption is violated, than mobility at the average rank (as measured by the rank-rank regression) does not represent mobility at other points in the earnings distribution. Figure 1 plots the average percentile in year $t+15$ by percentile in year $t$ for $t=1981$ and $t=1993$ for the population overall, for men and women separately, and by educational attainment. Non-linearities in the relationship between starting and ending rank violate the assumptions of the rank-rank summary measure, as it demonstrates that the correlation between starting and ending rank varies with starting rank.

As Figure 1 shows, there are some non-linearities in the relationship between starting and ending rank for all groups. The correlation between the starting and ending rank of earnings is higher for men and college-educated workers who begin their career near the top of the earnings distribution. There are changes in the sign of the slope coefficient near the top of the starting earnings distribution for women and those with less than a college degree. These non-linearities are driven by the small numbers of women and the less well-educated with earnings near the very top of the distribution and have largely disappeared over time.

We use two non-parametric measures of mobility to complement the rank-rank measure and serve as a robustness check on our results. First, we examine the change over time in the probability of starting one's career in the bottom $40 \%$ of the earnings distribution and ending one's career in the top $20 \%$. This measure is used in Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) for an earlier period and

Figure 1: Average Ending Rank by Starting Rank, Overall and by Gender and Education


Notes: Sample includes individuals ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$ and $t+15$. Age-adjusted average earnings is defined as the residuals from a regression of the seven-year average earnings centered around year $t$ on a quadratic in age separately for each year. Earnings percentiles for subgroups are assigned according to percentiles in the overall sample. Graphs are labelled using year $t$.
so allows us to compare our results to theirs, albeit for a different sample. Second, we show full decile transition matrices for the sample overall and for each subgroup.

## 3 Results

### 3.1 Rank-Rank Regression Measures of Mobility

Figure 2 shows the slope coefficient of the rank-rank regression between 1981 and 1993 overall in 2(a), separately for men and women in 2(b) and by educational attainment in 2(c). Shaded regions represent bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals. Overall, the correlation between one's rank in time $t$ and the same individual's rank in time $t+15$ has grown over time indicating a fall in lifetime mobility during the period. The fall in mobility is evident for both men and women and largest for individuals with a college degree. The overall slope is 0.59 in 1981 increasing to 0.63 in 1993, a
nearly $10 \%$ increase. These differences are statistically significant. The correlation between rank at the beginning and end of a working lifetime increased for both men and women by a similar amount-about 5 percentiles between 1981 and 1993-though women have a lower correlation in rank in the earnings distribution over the life cycle than men, indicating higher mobility.

The trends in the correlation between rank in the earnings distribution over a working lifetime differ sharply by educational attainment. For individuals with less than a high school degree, the correlation in rank over a working lifetime has increased slightly, though changes over time are not statistically significant. However, despite the rapid increase in the average cross-sectional returns to schooling over the 1980s, relative lifetime earnings mobility for college-educated workers declined. The correlation between starting and ending rank in the earnings distribution has increased substantially from 0.49 in 1981 to 0.56 in 1993-an increase of almost $15 \%$. These differences are statistically significant. The pattern of the decline in mobility suggests that mobility for the college educated declined in the 1980s, leveled off in the early 1990s, perhaps beginning to decline again after 1992. By 1993, college-educated workers no longer have greater positional lifetime earnings mobility than those with less education, rather positional earnings mobility across the three education groups is similar.

Figure 2: Age-Adjusted Coefficient of Rank-Rank Regression, Overall and by Gender and Education


Notes: Sample includes individuals ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$ and $t+15$. Age-adjusted average earnings is defined as the residuals from a regression of the seven-year average earnings centered around year $t$ on a quadratic in age separately for each year. Earnings percentiles for subgroups are assigned according to percentiles in the overall sample. Graphs are labelled using year $t$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in gray.

Figure 3 shows the intercept of the rank-rank regression between 1981 and 1993 overall in 3(a),
separately for men and women in 3(b) and by educational attainment in 3(c). Shaded regions represent $95 \%$ confidence intervals. The intercept represents the expected increase in rank for people starting their career in the bottom of the earnings distribution. Overall the intercept of the rank-rank regression has declined from 22.7 to 19.2, meaning that on average, individuals who start their career in the bottom of the earnings distribution can expect to rise about 3.5 fewer percentile ranks by the end of their career in 1993 relative to 1981. The differences are statistically significant. Figure 3(b) shows that women experience a higher average increase in rank over a working lifetime than men but that the average increase is declining for both men and women over time. Similarly Figure 3(c) shows that individuals with higher levels of schooling experience higher average increases in rank over a working lifetime but that this is declining over time, particularly for college graduates.

Figure 3: Age-Adjusted Intercept of Rank-Rank Regression, Overall and by Gender and Education


Notes: Sample includes individuals ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$ and $t+15$. Age-adjusted average earnings is defined as the residuals from a regression of the seven-year average earnings centered around year $t$ on a quadratic in age separately for each year. Earnings percentiles for subgroups are assigned according to percentiles in the overall sample. Graphs are labelled using year $t$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in gray.

Based on a rank-rank summary measure of mobility, mobility has declined over the last two decades. The increase in the slope coefficient in the rank-rank regression over time combined with the decrease in the intercept suggests that not only does one's place in the initial earnings distribution matter more today than in the past, but that on average, individuals are experiencing fewer gains in rank over a working lifetime. Though for some groups the declines in mobility are small, these trends are an important departure from Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) whose work covered an earlier period and suggested that mobility was declining for men but increasing
sufficiently for women so that overall mobility was increasing.

### 3.2 Non-Parametric Measures of Mobility

We complement the trends in the rank-rank summary measure of mobility with two non-parametric measures. Figure 4 shows the change over time in the probability of starting one's career in the bottom $40 \%$ of the earnings distribution and ending one's career in the top $20 \%$. Since the 1980 s, the probability of moving from below the 40th to above the 80th percentile of the earnings distribution fell by 1 percentage point from $6 \%$ to $5 \%$. The decline in the probability of upward mobility was larger for men than women though mobility also declined for women. Changes overall and for men and women separately are statistically significant. We also see statistically significant declines in mobility for workers with a college degree. For these workers, mobility fell by 2 percentage points between 1981 and 1993. Figure 4 shows flat mobility trends for workers with less than a college degree.

The same measure is used in Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) for an earlier period and so allows us to compare our results to theirs, albeit for a different sample. Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) show that during the middle part of the century the probability of upward mobility was rising and that the rise was due entirely to rising mobility among women. In contrast to the earlier period, the results here show that mobility has been falling in the latter decades of the 20th century when inequality was rising rapidly, and that both men and women have experienced declines in mobility over time. We note that Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010) find a slight downturn in mobility in the late-1970s for both men and women, with a level comparable to what is found here in 1981.

Decile transition matrices also confirm the declines in mobility that we document above. Appendix Tables A1-A12 show the complete decile transition matrices for the 1981-1996 period and the 1993-2008 period overall, for men and women separately, and separately by educational attainment. In Table 1 we show the trace of the transition matrix for the 1981-1996 and 1993 -

Figure 4: Probability of Moving from below 40th percentile to above the 80th percentile, Overall and by Gender and Education


Notes: Sample includes all men and women ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$. Age-adjusted average earnings is defined as the residuals from a regression of the seven-year average earnings centered around year $t$ on a quadratic in age separately for each year. The probability for each 15-year period is labelled by starting year. Bootstrapped 95\% confidence intervals are shown in grey.

2008 periods, a simple way of summarizing overall persistence. Tables 2-7 show the differences in the transition matrices over time. We show the percent change between the 1981-1996 period and the 1993-2008 period in the likelihood of ending in each decile conditional on beginning one's career in a given decile. In Tables 2-7, statistically significant increases between the two periods are denoted by stars and statistically significant declines are denoted by daggers.

Table 1: Trace of Decile Transition Matrices 1981-1996 and 1993-2008, Overall and by Gender and Education

|  | 1981 to 1996 | 1993 to 2008 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Everyone | 2.19 | 2.37 |
|  | $[2.17,2.21]$ | $[2.35,2.39]$ |
| Women | 2.03 | 2.31 |
|  | $[2.00,2.07]$ | $[2.28,2.35]$ |
| Men | 2.19 | 2.35 |
|  | $[2.16,2.22]$ | $[2.33,2.38]$ |
| High School | 2.18 | 2.22 |
|  | $[2.15,2.22]$ | $[2.18,2.25]$ |
| Some College | 2.07 | 2.20 |
|  | $[2.03,2.11]$ | $[2.17,2.24]$ |
| College | 1.82 | 2.15 |
|  | $[1.79,1.86]$ | $[2.10,2.19]$ |

Notes: Sample includes individuals ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$ and $t+15$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Deciles are determined using the full sample.

Overall and for each subgroup, the trace of the transition matrix has increase over time and all differences, except those for workers with a high school degree or less, are statistically significant. The trace increased by $8 \%$ overall and by $18 \%$ for college-educated workers.

The patterns of changing mobility in Tables 2-7 also show some remarkable consistencies across subgroups. First, overall and for each subgroup, the above diagonal elements are generally negative, indicating a decline over time in upward mobility over one's career, and the below diagonal elements are generally positive, indicating an increase over time in downward mobility. The only below diagonal elements that are nearly always negative is for the top earnings decile, that is, the probability of falling in rank over a career conditional on starting in the top decile has declined over time.

Table 2: Percent Change in Transition Probabilities, 1981-1996 Period to 1993-2008 Period, Overall

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Ending Decile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Starting Decile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | $9.46^{*}$ | $8.37^{*}$ | 5.28 | -3.27 | $-16.38^{\dagger}$ | $-15.21^{\dagger}$ | -15.56 | $-21.11^{\dagger}$ | -6.61 | -7.45 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | $10.06^{*}$ | 6.89 | 5.82 | 7.00 | -3.07 | $-16.65^{\dagger}$ | $-17.92^{\dagger}$ | $-24.19^{\dagger}$ | -12.25 | $-26.60^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | $9.54^{*}$ | 6.83 | 2.52 | 7.07 | 0.49 | -9.97 | $-12.88^{\dagger}$ | $-14.84^{\dagger}$ | -12.20 | -15.25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | 10.43 | 5.77 | $9.93^{*}$ | $7.50^{*}$ | 6.69 | -2.86 | $-18.36^{\dagger}$ | $-15.47^{\dagger}$ | $-18.75^{\dagger}$ | $-19.17^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | 7.70 | 1.22 | 3.59 | 6.28 | $11.04^{*}$ | 2.46 | -5.35 | -9.49 | $-18.85^{\dagger}$ | $-20.44^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | 5.77 | 1.59 | 1.11 | 8.19 | $12.12^{*}$ | $11.04^{*}$ | -1.77 | $-8.68^{\dagger}$ | $-16.26^{\dagger}$ | $-24.57^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 | 15.85 | 7.37 | 10.66 | 6.20 | $11.60^{*}$ | $11.80^{*}$ | $8.65^{*}$ | -5.34 | $-19.48^{\dagger}$ | $-25.75^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8 | $23.42^{*}$ | 10.29 | 1.91 | 5.26 | 7.29 | 7.76 | 6.03 | $7.34^{*}$ | $-7.98^{\dagger}$ | $-23.92^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | 18.16 | 18.45 | 11.56 | -0.22 | 5.06 | -5.32 | 1.79 | 0.50 | $8.46^{*}$ | $-13.01^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | 2.89 | -19.14 | -15.70 | -11.99 | -15.22 | -12.20 | -12.85 | -10.71 | $-7.10^{\dagger}$ | $8.58^{*}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: Sample includes individuals ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$ and $t+15$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Deciles are determined using the full sample.

Second, overall and for each subgroup, there has been a decline in the probability of ending one's career in the top $20 \%$ of the earnings distribution conditional on beginning one's career in the middle deciles (decile 4-7). This pattern holds for men, women, and across all educational attainment groups. These declines are relatively large, representing a decline of about $20 \%$ in the probability of reaching each of the top two deciles of the earnings distribution conditional on starting one's career in the middle of the earnings distribution. For example, between 1981 and

Table 3: Percent Change in Transition Probabilities, 1981-1996 Period to 1993-2008 Period, Women

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Ending Decile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Starting Decile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1 | $9.71^{*}$ | 7.61 | 5.81 | -1.67 | $-17.44^{\dagger}$ | $-19.83^{\dagger}$ | -10.21 | $-22.35^{\dagger}$ | -14.18 | -10.93 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | 8.27 | 6.33 | 8.68 | 6.40 | -2.12 | $-18.02^{\dagger}$ | $-20.63^{\dagger}$ | $-31.14^{\dagger}$ | -14.80 | -23.85 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3 | 7.94 | 6.68 | 4.58 | 5.69 | 2.83 | $-16.45^{\dagger}$ | $-18.00^{\dagger}$ | -10.98 | -5.21 | -17.68 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4 | 10.50 | 9.21 | 10.54 | 7.60 | 4.78 | -4.06 | $-22.23^{\dagger}$ | $-20.46^{\dagger}$ | $-22.90^{\dagger}$ | -4.65 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 | 14.17 | 8.42 | -1.73 | 2.95 | $14.49^{*}$ | 2.23 | -7.36 | -9.63 | $-27.24^{\dagger}$ | -24.27 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6 | 15.42 | -2.97 | 3.56 | $16.96^{*}$ | 9.00 | $16.28^{*}$ | -4.59 | -11.04 | $-25.77^{\dagger}$ | $-25.86^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7 | 16.04 | 17.69 | 5.03 | 3.79 | 8.80 | 7.41 | 8.11 | -5.09 | $-19.68^{\dagger}$ | $-19.62^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8 | 5.61 | 11.76 | 3.81 | 11.03 | 12.35 | -11.71 | 1.42 | 1.89 | 4.15 | $-19.79^{\dagger}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9 | 18.00 | 33.02 | 1.90 | -2.94 | -7.30 | 7.90 | -15.69 | -12.19 | 11.60 | -2.95 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | -26.82 | $-42.92^{\dagger}$ | $-46.96^{\dagger}$ | -34.20 | $-33.78^{\dagger}$ | -30.59 | -18.31 | -0.87 | -5.68 | $37.10^{*}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Notes: Sample includes all women ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Deciles are determined using the full sample.

Table 4: Percent Change in Transition Probabilities, 1981-1996 Period to 1993-2008 Period, Men

|  | Ending Decile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Starting Decile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | 7.74 | 15.70 | 10.43 | -5.91 | -9.09 | -2.36 | $-31.98^{\dagger}$ | -25.15 | -10.40 | -21.43 |
| 2 | $13.91^{*}$ | 9.91 | 2.04 | 11.68 | -3.47 | -14.83 | -15.57 | -13.92 | -17.82 | $-36.65^{\dagger}$ |
| 3 | 11.95 | 7.28 | 0.11 | 13.25 | -1.79 | 0.88 | -5.78 | $-21.86^{\dagger}$ | $-22.61^{\dagger}$ | -19.28 |
| 4 | 10.79 | 1.49 | 9.18 | 7.95 | 10.67 | -1.06 | $-13.58^{\dagger}$ | -10.40 | -16.27 | $-29.17^{\dagger}$ |
| 5 | 0.21 | -5.26 | 8.97 | 9.48 | 7.67 | 2.37 | -3.49 | -9.05 | -11.66 | -16.94 |
| 6 | -2.73 | 4.96 | -0.50 | 2.54 | $14.75^{*}$ | 6.83 | -0.07 | -7.29 | -8.63 | $-22.19^{\dagger}$ |
| 7 | 10.91 | -1.22 | 13.00 | 8.15 | $14.18^{*}$ | $15.12^{*}$ | $8.73^{*}$ | -6.26 | $-19.76^{\dagger}$ | $-25.60^{\dagger}$ |
| 8 | 23.66 | 5.19 | -0.34 | 3.49 | 7.21 | $17.57^{*}$ | $8.10^{*}$ | $9.32^{*}$ | $-12.98^{\dagger}$ | $-23.37^{\dagger}$ |
| 9 | 3.03 | 5.93 | 9.90 | -1.62 | 8.11 | -9.73 | 7.48 | 4.65 | $7.43^{*}$ | $-12.90^{\dagger}$ |
| 10 | 0.37 | -21.31 | -11.31 | -12.32 | -15.91 | -11.92 | $-15.90^{\dagger}$ | $-13.85^{\dagger}$ | $-7.27^{\dagger}$ | $8.50^{*}$ |

Notes: Sample includes all men ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Deciles are determined using the full sample.

1996, 11.39 \% of individuals starting their career in the fifth decile finished their career in the top two deciles. Between 1993 and 2008, this probability declined to $9.17 \%$. Declines in the probability of reaching the top two deciles are even larger conditional on starting in the 7th decile, going from $23.14 \%$ between 1981 and 1996, to $18.06 \%$ between 1993 and 2008. In contrast to the rank-rank regressions and Figure 4, Tables 5 and 6 show that mobility from the middle to the top of the earnings distribution has declined over time even for workers with less than a college degree.

Table 5: Percent Change in Transition Probabilities, 1981-1996 Period to 1993-2008 Period, High School or Less

|  | Ending Decile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Starting Decile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | 2.90 | 4.24 | 3.26 | -2.44 | $-17.81^{\dagger}$ | -13.44 | -18.29 | 3.53 | 44.79 | 18.02 |
| 2 | 8.63 | 0.47 | 0.67 | 5.13 | -3.21 | $-23.03^{\dagger}$ | -1.50 | -29.03 | 4.37 | -26.15 |
| 3 | 2.47 | -1.73 | 0.20 | 3.72 | 1.89 | 1.42 | -3.12 | -12.07 | -21.28 | -19.17 |
| 4 | 1.57 | 0.47 | 7.81 | 4.58 | 0.53 | -0.83 | $-17.79^{\dagger}$ | -11.84 | -5.06 | -25.15 |
| 5 | 0.79 | 7.81 | -0.45 | 5.88 | 8.22 | -5.13 | -8.36 | -10.66 | -14.02 | -13.36 |
| 6 | -6.62 | 2.63 | -0.90 | 9.22 | 7.56 | 7.88 | -5.31 | -8.74 | $-20.61^{\dagger}$ | -19.32 |
| 7 | 19.40 | 3.20 | 8.26 | 15.35 | 8.60 | 10.47 | 1.12 | $-16.11^{\dagger}$ | $-23.10^{\dagger}$ | -27.67 |
| 8 | 3.61 | 3.75 | -4.82 | 22.18 | 14.67 | $17.10^{*}$ | 5.91 | -3.79 | $-21.60^{\dagger}$ | -21.04 |
| 9 | 14.66 | 6.10 | 16.24 | 7.22 | 21.11 | -2.50 | 12.13 | 6.79 | -5.47 | $-30.22^{\dagger}$ |
| 10 | 4.69 | -11.24 | -18.34 | -10.56 | 12.40 | -0.10 | -4.84 | 4.01 | 0.09 | 1.88 |

Notes: Sample includes all individuals with a high school degree or less ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Deciles are determined using the full sample.

Table 6: Percent Change in Transition Probabilities, 1981-1996 Period to 1993-2008 Period, Some College

|  | Ending Decile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Starting Decile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | 12.53 | 9.56 | -0.25 | -3.80 | -15.07 | -14.14 | -10.90 | -15.59 | -5.92 | 17.36 |
| 2 | 6.89 | 5.68 | 6.17 | 3.27 | -6.34 | -12.01 | -19.27 | -7.08 | 4.70 | -10.30 |
| 3 | 9.53 | $18.53^{*}$ | 2.00 | 7.54 | -1.82 | $-17.81^{\dagger}$ | -15.08 | -15.06 | -5.51 | 1.11 |
| 4 | 9.94 | 1.31 | 6.79 | 7.72 | 12.69 | -3.43 | -14.77 | -17.25 | $-24.36^{\dagger}$ | -10.87 |
| 5 | 9.00 | -10.54 | 9.70 | 3.82 | 10.92 | 2.45 | -5.02 | -12.22 | -10.34 | -14.76 |
| 6 | 2.34 | -11.74 | 3.03 | 7.29 | 11.74 | 6.04 | -0.93 | -8.26 | -8.51 | -15.91 |
| 7 | 5.55 | 15.23 | 15.51 | -1.53 | 14.53 | $14.09^{*}$ | 2.80 | -7.41 | $-18.16^{\dagger}$ | $-22.03^{\dagger}$ |
| 8 | $34.34^{*}$ | 25.32 | -6.52 | -5.93 | 4.31 | 7.64 | 10.20 | $11.82^{*}$ | $-14.09^{\dagger}$ | $-28.45^{\dagger}$ |
| 9 | 29.47 | 12.02 | 13.61 | -7.07 | -0.10 | -8.08 | 4.21 | 6.22 | 6.26 | $-18.41^{\dagger}$ |
| 10 | -0.68 | -12.35 | -21.91 | 8.70 | -21.15 | -10.91 | -1.43 | -3.21 | 8.55 | 1.27 |

Notes: Sample includes all individuals with some college ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Deciles are determined using the full sample.

Some other patterns apply only to certain subgroups. Tables 2, 3, 4 and 7 show that overall, for men and women, and for college-educated workers, there has been a decline over time in the likelihood of large upward movements across the earnings distribution over a working lifetime, particularly for those who start their career near the bottom of the earnings distribution. For example, Table 2 shows that there was a $21.1 \%$ decline over time in the probability of ending one's career in

Table 7: Percent Change in Transition Probabilities, 1981-1996 Period to 1993-2008 Period, College +

|  | Ending Decile |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Starting Decile | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | $27.19^{*}$ | 16.00 | $35.52^{*}$ | -6.47 | -13.40 | -15.47 | -9.26 | $-28.16^{\dagger}$ | -16.88 | -14.22 |
| 2 | 11.04 | $45.80^{*}$ | 28.38 | 18.04 | 7.93 | -11.18 | $-21.87^{\dagger}$ | $-25.85^{\dagger}$ | -20.21 | -25.62 |
| 3 | $30.82^{*}$ | 18.11 | 18.71 | 19.63 | 2.94 | -13.47 | -16.38 | -14.21 | -11.07 | -14.68 |
| 4 | $35.16^{*}$ | $33.07^{*}$ | 18.11 | $31.22^{*}$ | 15.72 | -5.13 | $-20.72^{\dagger}$ | -17.07 | -16.02 | -20.35 |
| 5 | 24.55 | -0.61 | 4.54 | 10.44 | 20.53 | $25.97^{*}$ | 4.14 | -5.66 | $-27.99^{\dagger}$ | $-24.60^{\dagger}$ |
| 6 | $40.68^{*}$ | 14.60 | -0.98 | 6.51 | $31.90^{*}$ | $29.70^{*}$ | 7.78 | -8.26 | $-19.59^{\dagger}$ | $-33.15^{\dagger}$ |
| 7 | 35.94 | 3.51 | 8.64 | 2.28 | 14.73 | 17.85 | $34.35^{*}$ | 8.15 | $-20.82^{\dagger}$ | $-30.99^{\dagger}$ |
| 8 | 40.72 | 12.71 | 30.35 | 1.32 | 8.44 | -1.49 | 7.89 | $18.62^{*}$ | 2.33 | $-28.98^{\dagger}$ |
| 9 | 17.19 | $53.59^{*}$ | 17.43 | 3.42 | 1.68 | -0.71 | -6.32 | -5.81 | $17.83^{*}$ | $-12.39^{\dagger}$ |
| 10 | 34.36 | -10.28 | 16.33 | -9.23 | -6.88 | -8.79 | -10.34 | -10.53 | $-12.71^{\dagger}$ | $4.47^{*}$ |

Notes: Sample includes all individuals with a college degree ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets. Deciles are determined using the full sample.
the 8th decile of the earnings distribution conditional on starting one's career in the bottom decile. There was a corresponding increase of $9.46 \%$ and $8.37 \%$ in the probability of ending one's career in the bottom two deciles. A similar pattern is seen for men and women and for college-educated workers though not for workers with less than a college degree.

Finally, Tables 4 and 7 show that for men and college-educated workers, there has been a decline in small movements in rank for those who begin their career near the top of the distribution. For men, the probability of ending one's career in the top decile conditional on starting one's career in the top decile increased by $8.5 \%$ over time while the probability of ending one's career in the 8th or 9th deciles conditional on starting one's career in the top decile declined by $13.85 \%$ and $7.27 \%$, respectively.

### 3.3 Why is Mobility Declining?

Across a variety of measures, lifetime earnings mobility has declined over time. There is evidence of declining mobility in every subgroup, including college-educated workers and women. That lifetime earnings mobility has declined for college graduates and women since the 1980s is some-
what surprising given the increases over time in the cross-sectional returns to schooling and in female labor force attachment. While we are limited by the use of administrative data in understanding the full set of characteristics that are associated with declining mobility, we are able to consider whether rank-based mobility declines in some subgroups are the result of workers starting their career at higher parts of the earnings distribution which would reduce the possibility of further upward mobility. That is, mobility may be declining for women and college-educated workers because these individuals are more likely to be "stuck" at the top of the earnings distribution than in the past. Declines in mobility that are simply a result of starting one's career at a higher point in the earnings distribution may be less worrisome than declines in mobility that occur across the entire starting earnings distribution.

To examine the role of starting rank in upward mobility, Table 8 shows the average starting and ending rank overall and for each subgroup in the 1981-1996 and 1993-2008 periods with 95\% confidence intervals in brackets. Consistent with increases in educational attainment and stronger labor force attachment among women, we see that declines in mobility among women have occurred in part because women are starting their career at a higher point in the earnings distribution. The average starting rank for women in 1981 was 38.62 compared to 44.24 in 1993. Though women are starting their career at higher ranks in the earnings distribution, they are finishing their career only about 1 percentile higher in 2008 than in 1996. However, the entire decline in mobility for women is not simply due to increases in starting rank. We have also shown an increase over time in the probability of remaining in the same decile over a working life in Table 3 across the distribution of early-career earnings ranks. Conditional on starting their career in the top decile, women are $37.1 \%$ more likely to end their career in the top decile. And, conditional on starting their career in the bottom decile, women are $9.71 \%$ more likely to end their career in the bottom decile. As we have emphasized before, the probability of women starting their career in the middle of the earnings distribution and ending their career at the top of the earnings distribution has also declined over time.

Table 8: Starting and Ending Rank, Overall and by Gender and Education

|  | Starting Rank |  |  | Ending Rank |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1981 | 1993 |  | 1996 | 2008 |
| Everyone | 53.16 | 53.36 |  | 54.86 | 53.30 |
| Women | $[53.07,53.25]$ | $[53.27,53.45]$ |  | $[54.72,54.98]$ | $[53.20,53.40]$ |
| Men | 38.62 | 44.25 | 45.07 | 46.43 |  |
|  | $[38.45,38.80]$ | $[44.09,44.41]$ | $[44.82,45.31]$ | $[46.24,46.61]$ |  |
| High School | 63.83 | 61.07 | 62.03 | 59.12 |  |
|  | $[63.69,63.97]$ | $[60.94,61.20]$ | $[61.88,62.18]$ | $[58.93,59.30]$ |  |
| Some College | 46.19 | 44.15 | 44.82 | 42.40 |  |
|  | $[45.98,46.40]$ | $[43.96,44.33]$ | $[44.61,45.05]$ | $[42.22,42.58]$ |  |
| College | 52.29 | 51.88 | 53.69 | 51.93 |  |
|  | $[52.07,52.52]$ | $[51.68,52.08]$ | $[53.41,53.93]$ | $[51.71,52.15]$ |  |
|  | 63.38 | 66.39 | 69.50 | 68.39 |  |
|  | $[63.14,63.62]$ | $[66.15,66.68]$ | $[69.27,69.74]$ | $[68.15,68.63]$ |  |

Notes: Sample includes all individuals ages 25 to 59 who have average earnings above the minimum threshold and positive earnings in year $t$. Earnings ranks for education and gender subgroups are assigned using the full sample. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets.

In contrast to women, men and workers with less than a college degree are both starting and ending their career at lower ranks than in the past. On average, men and workers with a high school degree or less experience a decline in rank over a working life in both periods. By the 1993-2008 period, on average, workers with some college were also not experiencing any increase in rank over their working life. Table 8 combined with Table 4 suggests that over time, it has become more likely for men to fall one or two deciles and less likely for them to experience large increases in rank over their working life. For workers with less than a high school degree, mobility is largely flat but there is evidence that movements from the middle of the earnings distribution to the top of the earnings distribution have become less common over time.

Finally, for the college educated, the average rank of early-career earnings increased from 63.38 to 66.39 . However, the average rank of ending-career earnings went from 69.50 to 68.39 , a small but statistically significant decline. For college graduates, mobility is declining both because college graduates start their career at a higher rank and end their career at a lower rank in the earnings distribution than in the past, though changes over time in the starting rank are larger than changes in the ending rank. The transition matrices in Tables 7 show that the increase in persistence of
rank among the college educated has been felt across the distribution of early-career earnings. In particular, between the 1981-1996 and 1993-2008 periods, there has been a $27.19 \%$ ( $45.80 \%$ ) increase in the probability of ending one's career in the bottom (2nd) decile of the earnings distribution conditional on starting in that decile. The transition matrices also show a decline in reaching the top of the earnings distribution by the end of a career for college-educated workers who begin their career in the middle of the earnings distribution. In particular, the probability of reaching the top (9th) decile by the end of one's career conditional on starting in the 5th decile has declined by $24.6 \%$ ( $27.99 \%$ ). The same phenomenon is true for college-educated workers starting their career in the 6th and 7th deciles of the earnings distribution. There is also less churning at the top of the earnings distribution with workers starting in the 8th, 9th, and 10th deciles more likely to end their career in the same decile and less likely end their career in the surrounding deciles.

## 4 Conclusion

This paper exploits new administrative-linked survey data to understand trends in lifetime earnings mobility over the period of rapidly rising inequality. Though increasing through much of the 20th century, we show that intragenerational mobility has been declining since the early 1980s across a variety of rank-based measures. Mobility has declined for both men and women and among workers of all levels of education, with the largest declines among college-educated workers. In the presence of increasing inequality, falling mobility implies that as the rungs of the ladder have moved father apart, moving between them has become more difficult.

The transition matrices combined with the changes over time in the distribution of starting and ending earnings ranks suggest that several phenomenon are contributing to the declines in mobility. The increase in starting ranks for women and college-educated workers is one reason that mobility is declining for these groups. However, for men and less-educated workers, declines in mobility are largely a consequence of declining or stagnant rank in the earnings distribution over a working
lifetime. For all groups, the transition matrices show an increase in the persistence of earnings across the earnings distribution and a troubling decline upward mobility for workers who start near their career in the middle of the earnings distribution. Though absolute mobility is not the focus of this paper, the decline in mobility that we document has been accompanied by declines of about \$3,000 in median starting earnings combined with relatively stable median ending-career earnings. Declining median starting earnings highlights the concern associated with declining mobility in the middle of the earnings distribution.

Our findings on mobility are consistent with polarization of the labor market and differential employment growth across the wage distribution (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008) and imply that the polarization in the labor market at a single point in time, may have long-lived consequences for earnings across a working lifetime. Growth in employment at the bottom and top of the wage distribution has been coupled with increases in persistence in earnings across the early-career earnings distribution and with declining mobility among workers who start their career the middle of the earnings distribution. Moreover, our work showing less churning over a working lifetime among the top deciles of the earnings distribution is consistent with growth in inequality at the top of the earnings distribution (Piketty and Saez, 2003). Income inequality in the form of rapid growth in top income shares may contribute to declining mobility because the same absolute change in earnings moves one up fewer ranks now than in the past. Finally, it is likely that the observable and unobservable characteristics of workers overall, and of particular subgroups of workers, have changed over time. Increases in education attainment and female labor force participation have changed the composition of the U.S. labor market over time. Unfortunately these data do not allow us to examine anything about the underlying cognitive and non-cognitive skills of workers over time nor about trends in hours or weeks worked and so we are unable to tease out labor supply and other selection effects. This is a fruitful avenue for further research.

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A Appendix


























| Table A7: Decile Transition Matrices, High School or Less, 1981 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | $\begin{gathered} 28.85 \\ {[27.76,29.97]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.28 \\ {[22.30,24.34]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.78 \\ {[16.78,18.82]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.08 \\ {[11.21,12.89]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.19 \\ {[7.51,8.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.58 \\ {[4.05,5.11]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.62 \\ {[2.12,3.14]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.47 \\ {[1.17,1.79]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.70 \\ {[0.47,0.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.45 \\ {[0.23,0.72]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 2 | $\begin{gathered} 20.23 \\ {[19.25,21.26]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 21.74 \\ {[20.78,22.75]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 19.61 \\ {[18.64,20.57]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.41 \\ {[13.56,15.28]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.51 \\ {[8.73,10.30]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.80 \\ {[6.21,7.40]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.60 \\ {[3.07,4.16]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.19 \\ {[1.81,2.57]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.12 \\ {[0.87,1.40]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.79 \\ {[0.58,1.02]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 3 | $\begin{gathered} 14.14 \\ {[13.32,15.07]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.89 \\ {[16.92,18.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.40 \\ {[19.40,21.43]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.62 \\ {[16.66,18.58]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.18 \\ {[11.35,13.01]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.40 \\ {[6.72,8.17]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.63 \\ {[4.04,5.24]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.95 \\ {[2.55,3.37]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.74 \\ {[1.41,2.06]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.05 \\ {[0.80,1.32]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 4 | $\begin{gathered} 9.98 \\ {[9.25,10.71]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.12 \\ {[12.37,13.93]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.84 \\ {[14.92,16.80]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.81 \\ {[17.88,19.75]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.69 \\ {[14.83,16.54]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.02 \\ {[10.23,11.82]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.77 \\ {[7.00,8.47]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.23 \\ {[3.74,4.74]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.31 \\ {[1.97,2.67]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.22 \\ {[0.89,1.58]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 5 | $\begin{gathered} 7.47 \\ {[6.83,8.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.88 \\ {[8.21,9.59]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.59 \\ {[11.78,13.45]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.10 \\ {[15.30,16.97]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.16 \\ {[16.23,18.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.94 \\ {[15.02,16.90]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.76 \\ {[10.03,11.51]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.18 \\ {[5.60,6.81]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.32 \\ {[2.86,3.80]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.60 \\ {[1.27,1.92]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 6 | $\begin{gathered} 6.37 \\ {[5.74,7.00]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.92 \\ {[6.29,7.53]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.44 \\ {[8.70,10.17]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.13 \\ {[11.33,12.96]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.94 \\ {[15.03,16.80]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.35 \\ {[15.41,17.24]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.02 \\ {[14.17,15.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.72 \\ {[9.00,10.49]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.76 \\ {[5.20,6.36]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.34 \\ {[1.95,2.72]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 7 | $\begin{gathered} 4.17 \\ {[3.62,4.79]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.78 \\ {[5.19,6.40]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.10 \\ {[6.41,7.75]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.74 \\ {[8.04,9.48]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.38 \\ {[10.59,12.19]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.07 \\ {[15.15,17.02]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.76 \\ {[16.77,18.69]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.74 \\ {[14.84,16.70]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.33 \\ {[8.56,10.09]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.94 \\ {[3.47,4.46]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 8 | $\begin{gathered} 3.49 \\ {[2.90,4.11]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.32 \\ {[3.76,4.87]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.39 \\ {[4.72,6.09]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.67 \\ {[5.03,6.37]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.02 \\ {[7.24,8.81]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.95 \\ {[11.07,12.79]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.80 \\ {[16.75,18.87]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 21.20 \\ {[20.09,22.25]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.41 \\ {[15.46,17.43]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.75 \\ {[5.02,6.40]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 9 | $\begin{gathered} 2.41 \\ {[1.95,2.92]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.30 \\ {[2.82,3.86]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.78 \\ {[3.22,4.38]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.72 \\ {[4.03,5.44]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.78 \\ {[5.07,6.49]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.65 \\ {[7.71,9.54]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.68 \\ {[11.73,13.65]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.63 \\ {[19.43,21.83]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 24.43 \\ {[23.13,25.71]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.62 \\ {[12.70,14.61]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 10 | $\begin{gathered} 3.00 \\ {[2.37,3.70]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.32 \\ {[2.57,4.08]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.64 \\ {[2.63,4.52]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.45 \\ {[3.54,5.38]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.94 \\ {[4.06,5.92]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.56 \\ {[4.58,6.51]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.25 \\ {[6.09,8.35]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.33 \\ {[11.16,13.51]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.76 \\ {[22.20,25.38]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 31.75 \\ {[30.06,33.38]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | Notes: Sample in <br> $t$. Earnings decil | des all individua e assigned using | th a high school full sample. Boo | ree or less age apped $95 \%$ con | 59 who have e intervals are | e earnings above in brackets. | minimum thre | and positive ea | gs in year |  |


|  | Table A8: Decile Transition Matrices, High School or Less, 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | $\begin{gathered} 29.68 \\ {[28.60,30.77]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 24.27 \\ {[23.22,25.36]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.36 \\ {[17.45,19.31]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.78 \\ {[11.04,12.58]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.73 \\ {[6.10,7.39]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.96 \\ {[3.51,4.47]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.14 \\ {[1.81,2.49]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.52 \\ {[1.21,1.88]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.02 \\ {[0.80,1.25]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.53 \\ {[0.34,0.74]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 2 | $\begin{gathered} 21.98 \\ {[21.09,22.81]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 21.84 \\ {[20.95,22.76]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 19.74 \\ {[18.78,20.67]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.15 \\ {[14.31,16.00]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.20 \\ {[8.59,9.84]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.23 \\ {[4.74,5.74]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.55 \\ {[3.12,3.99]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.55 \\ {[1.23,1.86]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.17 \\ {[0.94,1.44]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.59 \\ {[0.42,0.76]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 3 | $\begin{gathered} 14.49 \\ {[13.75,15.22]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.58 \\ {[16.77,18.41]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.44 \\ {[19.57,21.29]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.28 \\ {[17.37,19.21]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.41 \\ {[11.76,13.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.50 \\ {[6.92,8.12]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.49 \\ {[4.05,4.97]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.59 \\ {[2.23,2.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.37 \\ {[1.10,1.65]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.85 \\ {[0.66,1.05]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 4 | $\begin{gathered} 10.14 \\ {[9.47,10.77]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.18 \\ {[12.40,13.97]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.08 \\ {[16.25,17.87]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 19.67 \\ {[18.89,20.55]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.78 \\ {[15.04,16.50]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.93 \\ {[10.22,11.64]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.39 \\ {[5.86,6.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.73 \\ {[3.32,4.17]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.19 \\ {[1.87,2.51]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.91 \\ {[0.71,1.12]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 5 | $\begin{gathered} 7.53 \\ {[6.94,8.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.58 \\ {[8.89,10.23]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.53 \\ {[11.77,13.25]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.05 \\ {[16.28,17.81]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.57 \\ {[17.64,19.47]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.12 \\ {[14.35,15.97]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.86 \\ {[9.24,10.48]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.52 \\ {[4.94,6.13]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.86 \\ {[2.49,3.25]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.39 \\ {[1.11,1.67]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 6 | $\begin{gathered} 5.95 \\ {[5.41,6.50]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.10 \\ {[6.49,7.76]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.35 \\ {[8.63,10.03]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.24 \\ {[12.39,14.11]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.14 \\ {[16.26,18.04]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.64 \\ {[16.76,18.48]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.22 \\ {[13.38,15.06]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.87 \\ {[8.17,9.59]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.58 \\ {[4.07,5.12]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.89 \\ {[1.60,2.20]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 7 | $\begin{gathered} 4.98 \\ {[4.42,5.57]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.97 \\ {[5.27,6.63]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.68 \\ {[7.02,8.33]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.08 \\ {[9.22,10.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.36 \\ {[11.55,13.13]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.75 \\ {[16.72,18.83]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.95 \\ {[17.03,18.91]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.21 \\ {[12.39,14.06]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.17 \\ {[6.51,7.81]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.85 \\ {[2.31,3.53]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 8 | $\begin{gathered} 3.61 \\ {[3.16,4.11]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.48 \\ {[3.85,5.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.13 \\ {[4.54,5.72]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.93 \\ {[6.20,7.69]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.20 \\ {[8.40,10.06]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.99 \\ {[13.13,14.90]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.85 \\ {[17.82,19.77]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.39 \\ {[19.39,21.41]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.87 \\ {[12.00,13.75]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.54 \\ {[3.98,5.13]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 9 | $\begin{gathered} 2.77 \\ {[2.19,3.36]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.50 \\ {[2.97,4.01]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.40 \\ {[3.76,5.00]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.06 \\ {[4.36,5.71]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.00 \\ {[6.20,7.85]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.43 \\ {[7.58,9.40]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.22 \\ {[13.16,15.26]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 22.03 \\ {[20.83,23.27]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.09 \\ {[21.86,24.32]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.50 \\ {[8.57,10.41]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 10 | $\begin{gathered} 3.14 \\ {[2.30,4.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.95 \\ {[2.22,3.81]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.98 \\ {[2.19,3.79]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.98 \\ {[2.92,5.00]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.55 \\ {[4.49,6.69]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.55 \\ {[4.59,6.59]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.90 \\ {[5.58,8.19]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.82 \\ {[11.18,14.50]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.78 \\ {[22.01,25.57]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 32.35 \\ {[30.01,34.75]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | Notes: Sample in $t$. Earnings decile | des all individua e assigned using | ith a high schoo full sample. B | ree or less age apped $95 \%$ con | 59 who have e intervals are | e earnings abo n in brackets. | minimum thre | and positive ea | gs in year |  |

deciles are assigned using the full sample. Bootstrapped $95 \%$ confidence intervals are shown in brackets.

| Table A10: Decile Transition Matrices, Some College, 1993 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | $\begin{gathered} 24.16 \\ {[22.69,25.56]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 19.64 \\ {[18.30,20.99]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.26 \\ {[15.00,17.47]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.81 \\ {[11.60,13.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.15 \\ {[8.26,10.04]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.67 \\ {[5.98,7.46]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.63 \\ {[3.93,5.36]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.40 \\ {[2.83,3.98]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.04 \\ {[1.63,2.45]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.25 \\ {[0.76,1.74]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 2 | $\begin{gathered} 17.31 \\ {[16.27,18.39]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.91 \\ {[16.88,18.92]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.76 \\ {[15.63,17.85]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.00 \\ {[14.08,15.95]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.37 \\ {[10.50,12.26]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.14 \\ {[7.37,8.93]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.41 \\ {[4.69,6.06]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.05 \\ {[3.47,4.62]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.62 \\ {[2.22,3.04]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1.43 \\ {[0.85,1.91]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 3 | $\begin{gathered} 11.75 \\ {[10.85,12.72]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.07 \\ {[13.21,14.93]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.05 \\ {[15.03,17.11]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.46 \\ {[15.46,17.45]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.30 \\ {[13.39,15.19]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 9.71 \\ {[8.96,10.46]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.30 \\ {[6.61,7.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.75 \\ {[4.20,5.34]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.54 \\ {[3.07,3.97]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.08 \\ {[1.69,2.48]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 4 | $\begin{gathered} 9.40 \\ {[8.55,10.32]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.46 \\ {[9.65,11.25]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.24 \\ {[12.37,14.12]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.38 \\ {[15.42,17.42]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.35 \\ {[15.51,17.19]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.62 \\ {[11.75,13.46]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.91 \\ {[8.19,9.67]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.35 \\ {[5.75,6.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.79 \\ {[3.31,4.27]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.51 \\ {[2.09,2.91]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 5 | $\begin{gathered} 6.51 \\ {[5.85,7.26]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.68 \\ {[7.00,8.37]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.35 \\ {[9.64,11.09]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.09 \\ {[12.21,13.89]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.82 \\ {[15.90,17.71]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.35 \\ {[14.31,16.37]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 12.78 \\ {[12.00,13.57]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.93 \\ {[8.24,9.67]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.76 \\ {[5.18,6.37]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.72 \\ {[2.31,3.12]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 6 | $\begin{gathered} 4.95 \\ {[4.45,5.43]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.37 \\ {[4.85,5.90]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.73 \\ {[7.08,8.36]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.39 \\ {[9.70,11.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.10 \\ {[13.24,14.93]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 17.02 \\ {[16.16,17.92]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 15.43 \\ {[14.56,16.34]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 13.04 \\ {[12.22,13.93]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 8.32 \\ {[7.67,8.97]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.65 \\ {[3.21,4.14]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 7 | $\begin{gathered} 4.15 \\ {[3.63,4.69]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.98 \\ {[4.44,5.57]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.06 \\ {[5.50,6.65]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.87 \\ {[7.23,8.51]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.89 \\ {[10.14,11.63]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 14.94 \\ {[14.12,15.77]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.15 \\ {[17.07,19.10]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.51 \\ {[15.51,17.48]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 11.18 \\ {[10.41,11.94]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.26 \\ {[4.71,5.86]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 8 | $\begin{gathered} 3.60 \\ {[3.15,4.03]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.76 \\ {[3.30,4.26]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.21 \\ {[3.76,4.71]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 5.47 \\ {[4.98,5.99]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.23 \\ {[6.63,7.86]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.80 \\ {[10.04,11.56]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.68 \\ {[15.86,17.54]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 22.49 \\ {[21.39,23.56]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 18.04 \\ {[17.14,18.98]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 7.72 \\ {[7.00,8.48]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 9 | $\begin{gathered} 2.84 \\ {[2.37,3.31]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.84 \\ {[2.35,3.39]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.29 \\ {[2.83,3.78]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.85 \\ {[3.32,4.36]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 4.83 \\ {[4.26,5.47]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.38 \\ {[5.76,7.00]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.67 \\ {[9.93,11.44]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 20.02 \\ {[19.01,21.01]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 28.57 \\ {[27.37,29.72]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 16.72 \\ {[15.75,17.73]} \end{gathered}$ |
| 10 | $\begin{gathered} 2.24 \\ {[1.80,2.70]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.20 \\ {[1.77,2.64]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 2.13 \\ {[1.63,2.63]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.18 \\ {[2.60,3.76]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.07 \\ {[2.49,3.65]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 3.98 \\ {[3.34,4.63]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6.30 \\ {[5.59,7.04]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 10.40 \\ {[9.41,11.33]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 23.90 \\ {[22.56,25.39]} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 42.61 \\ {[41.11,44.12]} \end{gathered}$ |
|  | Notes: Sample deciles are assi | es all individ sing the full s | h some colleg Bootstrapped | $25 \text { to } 59 \mathrm{wh}$ onfidence int | average earnin e shown in bra | ove the minimu | reshold and p | earnings in yea | Earnings |  |


| Table A11: Decile Transition Matrices, College + 1981 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1 | 21.47 | 17.93 | 16.30 | 13.32 | 10.77 | 7.77 | 5.19 | 4.03 | 2.17 | 1.07 |
|  | [19.73,23.01] | [16.50,19.32] | [15.03,17.62] | [12.21,14.41] | [9.76,11.79] | [6.66,8.87] | [4.46,5.91] | [3.36,4.69] | [1.64,2.74] | [0.75, 1.42] |
| 2 | 16.20 | 16.95 | 15.79 | 14.53 | 12.14 | 9.25 | 6.70 | 4.36 | 2.50 | 1.59 |
|  | [15.00,17.46] | [15.78,18.11] | [14.60,16.99] | [13.42,15.65] | [11.12,13.32] | [8.27,10.24] | [5.83,7.63] | [3.74,5.02] | [1.94,3.07] | [1.11,2.14] |
| 3 | 10.73 | 11.87 | 15.74 | 15.30 | 14.56 | 11.81 | 8.59 | 5.59 | 3.75 | 2.05 |
|  | [9.77,11.66] | [10.90,12.84] | [14.54,16.91] | [14.17,16.47] | [13.39,15.76] | [10.73,12.93] | [7.75,9.46] | [4.87,6.38] | [3.15,4.37] | [1.38,2.77] |
| 4 | 8.55 | 10.32 | 12.40 | 15.20 | 14.51 | 13.07 | 10.45 | 7.67 | 5.01 | 2.81 |
|  | [7.76,9.38] | [9.44,11.25] | [11.48,13.34] | [14.12,16.30] | [13.42,15.58] | [12.04,14.15] | [9.54,11.35] | [6.83,8.57] | [4.39,5.63] | [2.29,3.35] |
| 5 | 5.97 | 8.59 | 9.44 | 12.61 | 15.17 | 14.98 | 13.45 | 10.18 | 6.42 | 3.19 |
|  | [5.30,6.61] | [7.90,9.27] | [8.42,10.46] | [11.69,13.56] | [14.21,16.17] | [14.08,15.90] | [12.54,14.42] | [9.30,11.09] | [5.74,7.18] | [2.66,3.74] |
| 6 | 4.83 | 6.09 | 7.50 | 9.68 | 12.62 | 16.05 | 15.57 | 14.21 | 9.09 | 4.34 |
|  | [4.24,5.51] | [5.38,6.75] | [6.82,8.18] | [8.74,10.71] | [11.70,13.60] | [15.10,17.06] | [14.59,16.52] | [13.23,15.16] | [8.31,9.87] | [3.76,4.93] |
| 7 | 3.93 | 4.33 | 5.25 | 8.00 | 9.51 | 13.09 | 17.65 | 17.83 | 13.67 | 6.74 |
|  | [3.33,4.51] | [3.72,4.93] | [4.65,5.92] | [7.20,8.78] | [8.64,10.46] | [12.09,14.12] | [16.63,18.68] | [16.84,18.82] | [12.65,14.69] | [6.05,7.46] |
| 8 | 2.68 | 3.00 | 4.50 | 5.82 | 6.93 | 10.03 | 15.13 | 20.11 | 20.99 | 10.79 |
|  | [2.21,3.14] | [2.55,3.48] | [3.93,5.11] | [5.18,6.50] | [6.23,7.65] | [9.20,10.88] | [14.16,16.05] | [19.05,21.17] | [19.97,22.08] | [9.67,11.80] |
| 9 | 2.19 | 2.53 | 2.89 | 4.15 | 4.84 | 6.94 | 10.23 | 18.85 | 26.89 | 20.49 |
|  | [1.79,2.61] | [2.10,3.00] | [2.41,3.37] | [3.54,4.75] | [4.19,5.50] | [6.24,7.74] | [9.38,11.09] | [17.83,19.92] | [25.62,28.21] | [19.28,21.64] |
| 10 | 2.26 | 2.50 | 2.73 | 2.92 | 3.90 | 4.46 | 6.39 | 10.74 | 22.02 | 42.07 |
|  | [1.73,2.83] | [2.02,3.02] | [2.07,3.41] | [2.36,3.50] | [3.26,4.56] | [3.63,5.26] | [5.59,7.25] | [9.77,11.75] | [20.64,23.44] | [40.50,43.65] |
|  | Notes: Sample in Age-adjusted ave year. Bootstrappe | des all men an e earnings is de $5 \%$ confidence | men with a colle as the residuals als are shown in | degree ages 25 to a regression of ckets. | who have avera even-year averag | arnings above th arnings centered | inimum thresho nd year $t$ on a | an positive earni atic in age separ | in year $t$. y for each |  |

Table A12: Decile Transition Matrices, College +, 1993

| 1 | 24.16 | 19.64 | 16.26 | 12.81 | 9.15 | 6.67 | 4.63 | 3.40 | 2.04 | 1.25 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [22.69,25.56] | [18.30,20.99] | [15.00,17.47] | [11.60,13.94] | [8.26,10.04] | [5.98,7.46] | [3.93,5.36] | [2.83,3.98] | [1.63,2.45] | [0.76,1.74] |
| 2 | 17.31 | 17.91 | 16.76 | 15.00 | 11.37 | 8.14 | 5.41 | 4.05 | 2.62 | 1.43 |
|  | [16.27,18.39] | [16.88,18.92] | [15.63,17.85] | [14.08,15.95] | [10.50,12.26] | [7.37,8.93] | [4.69,6.06] | [3.47,4.62] | [2.22,3.04] | [0.85,1.91] |
| 3 | 11.75 | 14.07 | 16.05 | 16.46 | 14.30 | 9.71 | 7.30 | 4.75 | 3.54 | 2.08 |
|  | [10.85,12.72] | [13.21,14.93] | [15.03,17.11] | [15.46,17.45] | [13.39,15.19] | [8.96,10.46] | [6.61,7.94] | [4.20,5.34] | [3.07,3.97] | [1.69,2.48] |
| 4 | 9.40 | 10.46 | 13.24 | 16.38 | 16.35 | 12.62 | 8.91 | 6.35 | 3.79 | 2.51 |
|  | [8.55,10.32] | [9.65,11.25] | [12.37,14.12] | [15.42,17.42] | [15.51,17.19] | [11.75,13.46] | [8.19,9.67] | [5.75,6.94] | [3.31,4.27] | [2.09,2.91] |
| 5 | 6.51 | 7.68 | 10.35 | 13.09 | 16.82 | 15.35 | 12.78 | 8.93 | 5.76 | 2.72 |
|  | [5.85,7.26] | [7.00,8.37] | [9.64,11.09] | [12.21,13.89] | [15.90,17.71] | [14.31,16.37] | [12.00,13.57] | [8.24,9.67] | [5.18,6.37] | [2.31,3.12] |
| 6 | 4.95 | 5.37 | 7.73 | 10.39 | 14.10 | 17.02 | 15.43 | 13.04 | 8.32 | 3.65 |
|  | [4.45,5.43] | [4.85,5.90] | [7.08,8.36] | [9.70,11.10] | [13.24,14.93] | [16.16,17.92] | [14.56,16.34] | [12.22,13.93] | [7.67,8.97] | [3.21,4.14] |
| 7 | 4.15 | 4.98 | 6.06 | 7.87 | 10.89 | 14.94 | 18.15 | 16.51 | 11.18 | 5.26 |
|  | [3.63,4.69] | [4.44,5.57] | [5.50,6.65] | [7.23,8.51] | [10.14,11.63] | [14.12,15.77] | [17.07,19.10] | [15.51,17.48] | [10.41,11.94] | [4.71,5.86] |
| 8 | 3.60 | 3.76 | 4.21 | 5.47 | 7.23 | 10.80 | 16.68 | 22.49 | 18.04 | 7.72 |
|  | [3.15,4.03] | [3.30,4.26] | [3.76,4.71] | [4.98,5.99] | [6.63,7.86] | [10.04,11.56] | [15.86, 17.54] | [21.39,23.56] | [17.14,18.98] | [7.00,8.48] |
| 9 | 2.84 | 2.84 | 3.29 | 3.85 | 4.83 | 6.38 | 10.67 | 20.02 | 28.57 | 16.72 |
|  | [2.37,3.31] | [2.35,3.39] | [2.83,3.78] | [3.32,4.36] | [4.26,5.47] | [5.76,7.00] | [9.93,11.44] | [19.01,21.01] | [27.37,29.72] | [15.75,17.73] |
| 10 | 2.24 | 2.20 | 2.13 | 3.18 | 3.07 | 3.98 | 6.30 | 10.40 | 23.90 | 42.61 |
|  | [1.80,2.70] | [1.77,2.64] | [1.63,2.63] | [2.60,3.76] | [2.49,3.65] | [3.34,4.63] | [5.59,7.04] | [9.41,11.33] | [22.56,25.39] | [41.11,44.12] | $t$ on a quadratic in age separately


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    The authors gratefully acknowledge funding for this project from the Russell Sage Foundation (\#83-15-09) and the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.
    ${ }^{1}$ This literature is large and too numerous to cite here. See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008); DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Gottschalk and Danziger (2005); Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2010); Piketty and Saez (2003) for important examples.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ See Fields (2010) and Fields and Ok (1999) for a description of mobility concepts and measures.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ This analysis was first performed using the SIPP Synthetic Beta (SSB) on the Synthetic Data Server housed at Cornell University which is funded by NSF Grant \#SES-1042181. These data are public use and may be accessed by researchers outside secure Census facilities. For more information, visit https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/methodology/sipp-synthetic-beta-data-product.html. Final results for this paper were obtained from a validation analysis conducted by Census Bureau staff using the SIPP Completed Gold Standard Files and the programs written by this author and originally run on the SSB. The validation analysis does not imply endorsement by the Census Bureau of any methods, results, opinions, or views presented in this paper

